critical thinking requires the presence of prejudice

Prejudiced thoughts run through all our minds — the key is what we do with them

Share this idea.

• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window)

We tend to think of prejudice as something that other people, particularly bad people, have in their hearts and minds.

The truth is, prejudice is inside us all. The good news is that psychology provides a powerful way to combat it.

Prejudice is due in part to cultural learning, from our parents, our schools and social messages and depictions in the media. But prejudice is also deeply embedded into our thought networks. Numerous studies have been done on implicit bias , the negative stereotyping and othering that we are not consciously aware of.

Whether we like it or not, prejudice easily digs into us. So if we’re going to combat it, we need to change how our minds deal with it.

Since I was a young child, I’ve been pained by the brutality of prejudice and how it impacts us all. I’ve also learned how profoundly it shaped the lives of my Jewish ancestors, and I’ve witnessed it directed at my children who are multiracial.

Growing up, I did not know that my mother had been told by her father — who had become swept up by the fervor of Hitler-era Germany — never to tell anyone she had “tainted blood.” My mother’s name was not Ruth Eileen Dreyer, as she claimed, but Ruth Esther Dreyer. It was only later I learned that fact and that half of her maternal aunts and uncles died crowded into “shower rooms” meant not to cleanse them, but to cleanse the world of them.

I first encountered prejudice in my childhood friend Tom, who was white like me. He spewed venom about people of other races and ethnicities, calling them the n-word and other foul names. It bothered me, and I even got into a fistfight with him over it.

Regardless of my contempt for them, his slurs sank into my mind. One day, Tom and I — along with our friend Joe — rode our bikes to a bowling alley to play a game.

As we set up, Tom strangely commented, “It looks like rain.” He and Joe giggled. I was confused. From where we were, we couldn’t see the outside.

“It looks like raaaain,” Tom repeated loudly as he and Joe tried to repress their laughter.

Finally, I noticed a Black man walking toward us — a dark cloud was rolling in. Get it?

I was horrified, and I felt sick to my stomach. But the thought also flittered into my mind that I was glad they weren’t making fun of me.

Flash forward a couple of decades. My then-teenage daughter Camille was dressed up for a school dance, looking absolutely wonderful. She is Afro-Latina-American (my first wife was Latina, Camille was her child from a previous relationship, and I adopted her).

As I watched her approach, a voice bubbled up inside my head, unbidden and unwelcome. The auditory equivalent of a smirk, it was Tom’s voice, saying very clearly, “It looks like raaaain.”

Last year, I told the story of Tom’s voice popping into my head to Camille.

Her response was sweet and pure. “I love you, Daddy,” she said. “We all have burdens like that to carry.”

Yes, we do.

Negative stereotypes pervade people’s lives. Even if you hate them — or are the victim of them — they are in your cognitive network. That means they are available to do mischief, even when you’re not conscious of it. If you go to the rigid, defended, frightened, angry, judgmental parts of your own heart, you will see that bias resides there.

But you can learn to use that recognition, and apply it to reduce the harmful impact of that part of you  and the chance that your privilege and prejudice could be passed to others. By applying the practices of acceptance and commitment therapy — which focus on cultivating psychological flexibility rather than struggle and avoidance — to investigate your implicit biases, you become more aware of them and bring your actions in line with your conscious beliefs. This kind of mindful awareness allows prejudicial thoughts to become less dominant, and studies show it can even help us commit to positive actions to combat prejudice.

My lab researched this. We studied many forms of prejudice, including gender bias, weight bias, bias based on sexual orientation, ethnicity and more. We expected to find a common core, and we did.

We found that all forms of prejudice can be largely explained by what’s called authoritarian distancing — the belief that we are different from some group of “others” and because they are different, they represent a threat that we need to control.

When my lab examined the psychological factors led some people to settle into authoritarian distancing, we found three key characteristics:

• the relative inability to take the perspective of other people;
• the inability to feel the pain of others when you do take their perspective;
• the inability to be emotionally open to the pain of others when you do feel it.

Drawing on our findings, we developed interventions that have been found to significantly reduce prejudice.

In some ways, the most difficult to eradicate forms of bias are invisible and unconscious because they are based on privilege. For example, a white person can honestly say “I don’t think about race”, but she’s not aware of how much that exudes privilege when her Black neighbor has no choice but to think about it — she sends her teenage son out into the world every day, knowing that he is more likely to be arrested or shot at because he is Black.

Similarly, a man can believe that he is without gender bias but still talk more than — and over — his women colleagues in meetings.

Because it’s unfair and irresponsible to ask those who bear the costs of privilege to do all the heavy lifting to correct it, the first step is to look at your own behavior. Try to notice your indirect indicators of bias — the times in which your supposedly unbiased actions are actually rooted and shaped by your privilege.

As you’re doing this, ask people who are close to you and who’ve experienced bias if they can help you. For example, when I start mansplaining, my wife gives me a look. Do not expect this to feel good, but it’s a worthy journey.

Here are 3 steps that you can take to start recognizing and disarming your own prejudice:

1. Own your bias

Observe any tendencies to judge others or yourself or to enact bias based on privilege. Bring as much self-compassion and emotional openness to that awareness as you can. When do you notice prejudicial thoughts or biased actions popping up?

Let go of any tendency to buy into your judgement or make them more important by avoiding them or criticizing yourself for hosting them. These are thoughts, feelings, and invisible habits, and they are yours. You are responsible, but you are not to blame.

Just note their existence and increase your awareness of the negative cultural programming that we all carry.

2. Connect with other people’s perspective

Deliberately take the perspective of those whom your mind judges, feeling what it’s like to be subjected to stigma and bias, sometimes without conscious awareness by the person doing harm.

Don’t run from the pain of seeing those costs, or allow it to slip into guilt or shame. The goal is connection and ownership.

Allow the pain of being judged or being hurt to penetrate you. As you do, bring your awareness to how causing anyone that kind of pain goes against your values.

3. Commit to change 

Channel the discomfort of ownership and the pain of connection into a motivation to act. Commit to concrete steps that you can take to reduce the effect of prejudice and stigma on others.

This could mean learning to listen more; speaking out when another person makes light of prejudice; stepping back so others can step forward; joining an advocacy group; getting to know people who belong to groups that your mind judges.

Taking these actions is not meant to erase what you are carrying and experiencing but to channel those feelings toward expressing compassion.

You can practice these steps regularly. As you begin to loosen the grip of your implicit biases, you’ll find that your enjoyment of being with people of all kinds increases, no matter how different they may have once seemed to you.

The sad fact is if we’re not helping solve the problem of prejudice, we are helping to perpetuate it. And if we don’t learn to acknowledge our privilege or catch the subtly prejudicial thoughts that go through our minds, we are supporting bias — and potentially passing it on.

It’s hard to admit to ourselves that we’ve been complicit, and it’s hard to diminish the impact of bias. But with work, we can do it.

Excerpted with permission from the new book  A Liberated Mind: How to Pivot Towards What Matters  by Steven C. Hayes. Published by Avery, an imprint of Penguin Random House, LLC. © 2020 by Steven C. Hayes.

Watch his TEDxUniversityofNevada Talk here: 

About the author

Steven C. Hayes, PhD , is a professor of psychology at the University of Nevada, Reno. The author of 43 books and more than 600 scientific articles, he has served as president of the Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapy and the Association for Contextual Behavioral Science, and is one of the most cited psychologists in the world. Dr. Hayes initiated the development of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and of Relational Frame Theory (RFT), the approach to cognition on which ACT is based.

• book excerpt
• steven hayes

TED Talk of the Day

How to make radical climate action the new normal

6 ways to give that aren't about money

A smart way to handle anxiety -- courtesy of soccer great Lionel Messi

How do top athletes get into the zone? By getting uncomfortable

6 things people do around the world to slow down

Creating a contract -- yes, a contract! -- could help you get what you want from your relationship

Could your life story use an update? Here’s how to do it 

6 tips to help you be a better human now

How to have better conversations on social media (really!)

3 strategies for effective leadership, from a former astronaut

Is empathy overrated?

How literature -- yes, literature -- can help you better connect with others

The fastest way to fight prejudice? Open up

Why we need to call out casual racism

Translate this page from English...

*Machine translated pages not guaranteed for accuracy. Click Here for our professional translations.

Our Concept and Definition of Critical Thinking

It is sending your message ...

Aug 26, 2024

Prejudice and Education in the 21st Century

March 20, 2018.

Conrad Hughes takes the conversation further into the what and how of prejudice, as well as how 21st-century education can combat prejudice.

illustration by Daniel Stolle

By conrad hughes, 20/03/ 2018.

Prejudice is a negative overgeneralization of another person or group. It comes from the Latin, meaning to pre-judge. Whereas a stereotype is a mere overgeneralization that one holds as an idea, prejudice takes the stereotype a step further by applying it negatively to real-life members of a social group in thoughts and language. When prejudice is translated into action, it can become discrimination or worse.

We are cognitively, socially, and culturally disposed to be prejudiced. Our brains work by classification and we tend to quickly reduce individuals to crude social categories in order to judge those individuals as friend or foe. This activity, in the early, reptilian part of our brain, happens more quickly than we are aware. Feelings of insecurity, threat, and fear often well up inside us and express themselves in the form of an instinct toward self-preservation which always prioritizes and favors the in-group at the expense of the out-group.

Even at the level of the cortex, where information is processed and we are capable of abstract thinking, deliberate evaluation, and weighted reflection, our working memory capacity is fairly weak, meaning that we struggle to hold onto pluralistic representations or multiple identities without forgetting some of them and reducing the thing perceived into a single entity. This is what happens when we reduce someone to one element of his/her being, for example, profession, gender, ethnic group, ideological preferences, beliefs, or nationality. Furthermore, we are perceptually predisposed to exaggerate differences between groups and minimize differences within groups, always imagining that we are like those in our group and different from those who are not in our group when in reality, differences and similarities might be the same within and across group members.

Therefore, like all sophisticated and powerful educational efforts, reducing prejudice requires a conscious effort to go beyond intuitive, lazy thinking and primal instincts; it is an act of the will involving critical thinking, self-analysis, metacognition, and deliberate selflessness—things that might not come naturally to us and have to be worked on.

School children writing in classroom. Photograph: Alamy

Prejudice on the rise

The second decade of the 21st century is full of paradox. On the one hand, one might argue that globalization and social media have brought people closer together than ever. Travel is far more accessible than it has ever been and material comfort is attainable for an increasing number of people. This would suggest that relationships across frontiers are easier to form than ever before. On the other hand, few could disagree that we have witnessed a surge of extremist thinking in right-wing demagogy, xenophobic rhetoric, and fundamentalism across the planet. As the planet’s biocapacity wanes, wealth and income inequality rise, and human resources become increasingly scarce, the idea of living together peacefully seems fragile.

Examples of prejudice and discrimination are so rife that one struggles to know where to begin. The US Department of Justice (2014) recorded over 220,000 cases of hate crimes every year from 2004 to 2012; the UK Home Office (Creese and Lader, 2014) reported that “in 2013/14, there were 44,480 hate crimes recorded by the police, an increase of five per cent compared with 2012/13, of which 37,484 (84%) were race hate crimes”. Before Adolph Hitler’s Mein Kampf was republished in Germany in 2016, over 15,000 people had placed orders (Addady, 2016). The Black Lives Matter movement in the United States points to a sorry state of affairs while anti-Islamic rhetoric is at a height in Europe and the United States. Albinos, Aborigines, Roma, Jews, and homosexuals still suffer from severe prejudice across the globe, while women throughout the world are the victims of lower salaries and conjugal violence. We are also deep in the throes of an uninhibited, post-politically–correct type of prejudice where racist, xenophobic, misogynistic, and bigoted statements are made in the public forum in the name of a sort of aggressive, liberated freedom of speech.

The phenomenon of the Internet has allowed anonymized, disinhibited discourse to proliferate on postings and messages. Anyone knows by trawling through the comments posted at the end of an article or YouTube video that discussions quickly veer into extremist language and propositions, as if to suggest that there is a deep-seated need to engage in profanity and verbal violence as a type of expiation or catharsis. Furthermore, confirmation bias is easy: a determined user can find some form of reported evidence proving one theory or another on the Internet, making it an easy repository of justification that the prejudiced person can cherry-pick at will. For example, statistics on crime are often used by right-wing politicians to slander ethnic minorities but are rarely put in their proper context of socioeconomic and demographic pressure.

The contact hypothesis

In 1954, Gordon Allport articulated his contact hypothesis in The Nature of Prejudice , his detailed study of prejudice from the perspective of social psychology. The theory remains a reference because it has been tested extensively with significant results over more than 50 years. Allport’s hypothesis states that we can lessen prejudice if people of different backgrounds come together and make contact, provided that four conditions are present:

Social psychology tells us that if environments are created where people can work together as a team on a collective goal under clearly articulated values that celebrate the equal value of each person, prejudice will be reduced. However, if people of different backgrounds are thrown together without any mediating strategies, there is a high likelihood that they will resort to stereotypes, then to prejudice, then to antilocution, and finally to violence, especially if the environment is highly competitive (as it often is in schools). Indeed, the intuitive idea that pluralistic or multicultural environments will lead to peaceful self-regulated appreciation of di­fference is wrong; ground rules are needed alongside a strong institutional message against prejudicial thinking and discriminatory practice.

An education for less prejudice

The Delors Report (UNESCO, 1996) describes four pillars of education: learning to learn, learning to do, learning to be, and learning to live together. If these are the basis of meaningful education, then learning how to reduce prejudice is surely a fundamental, ongoing goal. Reducing prejudice means reducing barriers that stand in the way of self-awareness, social cohesion, open-mindedness, and the growth mindset needed to open new opportunities to work with different people.

In my recently published book, Understanding Prejudice and Education: The Challenge for Future Generations (Routledge, 2017), I synthesized research in social psychology, cognitive psy­chology, critical thinking, and international education to pre­sent a model that can be adapted and adopted according to context. Each area should be self-assessed using criterion-referenced descriptors. Four areas need to be emphasized at an individual level:

We will never eradicate prejudice (it’s in our DNA), but we can reduce it if schools, instructors, and learners can openly discuss what prejudice means to them and learn about other people and the world in a reflective, open-minded, pluralistic manner. If we wish to make the world a better place, then a sure place to start is with the way that human beings see and treat each other, something that can be made more humane, nuanced, and restorative if it is taken seriously in the educational agenda.

Addady, M. (2016, Jan. 11). Mein Kampf is the hottest book in Germany. Fortune .

Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice . Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Creese, B., & Lader, D. (2014). Hate crimes, England and Wales, 2013/14 . Home Office Statistical Bulletin. London: Home Office.

Hughes, C. (2016). Understanding prejudice and education: The challenge for future generations. Oxford: Routledge.

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2008). How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators. European Journal of Social Psychology , 38 , 922-934.

UNESCO (1996). Learning: The treasure within . Paris: UNESCO.

US Department of Justice, Office of Justice (2014). Hate crime victimization , 2004–2012: Statistical tables . Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.

• Tools and Resources
• Customer Services
• Affective Science
• Biological Foundations of Psychology
• Clinical Psychology: Disorders and Therapies
• Cognitive Psychology/Neuroscience
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational/School Psychology
• Forensic Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems of Psychology
• Individual Differences
• Methods and Approaches in Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational and Institutional Psychology
• Personality
• Psychology and Other Disciplines
• Social Psychology
• Sports Psychology
• Share This Facebook LinkedIn Twitter

Article contents

Stereotypes and prejudice.

• David Marx David Marx San Diego State University, Department of Psychology
•  and  Sei Jin Ko Sei Jin Ko San Diego State University, Department of Psychology
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.307
• Published online: 23 May 2019

Stereotypes are widely held generalized beliefs about the behaviors and attributes possessed by individuals from certain social groups (e.g., race/ethnicity, sex, age, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation). They are often unchanging even in the face of contradicting information; however, they are fluid in the sense that stereotypic beliefs do not always come to mind or are expressed unless a situation activates the stereotype. Stereotypes generally serve as an underlying justification for prejudice, which is the accompanying feeling (typically negative) toward individuals from a certain social group (e.g., the elderly, Asians, transgender individuals). Many contemporary social issues are rooted in stereotypes and prejudice; thus research in this area has primarily focused on the antecedents and consequences of stereotype and prejudice as well as the ways to minimize the reliance on stereotypes when making social judgments.

• stereotypes
• stereotype activation
• implicit bias
• prejudice reduction
• implicit measures
• explicit measures
• stereotype maintenance

You do not currently have access to this article

Please login to access the full content.

Access to the full content requires a subscription

Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Psychology. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 26 August 2024

• Cookie Policy
• Privacy Policy
• Legal Notice
• Accessibility
• [185.80.150.64]
• 185.80.150.64

Character limit 500 /500

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

• View all journals
• Explore content
• About the journal
• Publish with us
• Sign up for alerts
• Review Article
• Published: 04 September 2014

The neuroscience of prejudice and stereotyping

• David M. Amodio 1  

Nature Reviews Neuroscience volume  15 ,  pages 670–682 ( 2014 ) Cite this article

26k Accesses

284 Citations

309 Altmetric

Metrics details

• Decision making
• Functional magnetic resonance imaging
• Social neuroscience

Prejudice is a fundamental component of human social behaviour that represents the complex interplay between neural processes and situational factors. Hence, the domain of intergroup bias, which encompasses prejudice, stereotyping and the self-regulatory processes they often elicit, offers an especially rich context for studying neural processes as they function to guide complex social behaviour.

The sociocognitive processes involved in prejudice, stereotyping and the regulation of intergroup responses engage different sets of neural structures that seem to comprise separate functional networks.

Prejudice is an evaluation of, or an emotional response towards, a social group based on preconceptions. Prejudiced responses range from the rapid detection of threat or coalition and subjective visceral responses to deliberate evaluations and dehumanization — processes that are supported most directly by the amygdala, orbital frontal cortex, insula, striatum and medial prefrontal cortex.

Stereotypes represent the cognitive component of intergroup bias — the conceptual attributes associated with a particular social group. Stereotyping involves the encoding of group-based concepts and their influence on impression formation, social goals and behaviour. These processes are primarily underpinned by the anterior temporal lobes and the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices.

Expressions of prejudice and stereotyping are often regulated on the basis of personal beliefs and social norms. This regulatory process involves neural structures that are typically recruited for cognitive control, such as the dorsal anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortices, as well as structures supporting mentalizing and perspective taking, such as the rostral anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortices.

Situated at the interface of the natural and social sciences, the neuroscience of prejudice offers a unique context for understanding complex social behaviour and an opportunity to apply neuroscientific advances to pressing social issues.

Despite global increases in diversity, social prejudices continue to fuel intergroup conflict, disparities and discrimination. Moreover, as norms have become more egalitarian, prejudices seem to have 'gone underground', operating covertly and often unconsciously, such that they are difficult to detect and control. Neuroscientists have recently begun to probe the neural basis of prejudice and stereotyping in an effort to identify the processes through which these biases form, influence behaviour and are regulated. This research aims to elucidate basic mechanisms of the social brain while advancing our understanding of intergroup bias in social behaviour.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution

Access options

Subscribe to this journal

Receive 12 print issues and online access

176,64 € per year

only 14,72 € per issue

Buy this article

• Purchase on SpringerLink
• Instant access to full article PDF

Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkout

Similar content being viewed by others

The neural representation of stereotype content

Neural dynamics of racial categorization predicts racial bias in face recognition and altruism

Integrating stereotypes and factual evidence in interpersonal communication

Brewer, M. B. The psychology of prejudice: ingroup love and outgroup hate? J. Soc. Issues 55 , 429–444 (1999).

Google Scholar  

Ito, T. A. & Urland, G. R. Race and gender on the brain: electrocortical measures of attention to the race and gender of multiply categorizable individuals. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 85 , 616–626 (2003).

PubMed   Google Scholar  

Ratner, K. G. & Amodio, D. M. Seeing “us versus them”: minimal group effects on the neural encoding of faces. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 49 , 298–301 (2013).

Allport, G. W. The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley, 1954).

Fiske, S. T. in The Handbook of Social Psychology Vol. 2 , 4th edn (eds Gilbert, D. T., Fiske, S. T. & Lindzey, G.) 357–411 (McGraw Hill, 1998).

Amodio, D. M. & Devine, P. G. Stereotyping and evaluation in implicit race bias: evidence for independent constructs and unique effects on behavior. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 91 , 652–661 (2006).

Devine, P. G. Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled components. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 56 , 5–18 (1989).

Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C. & Williams, C. J. Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: a bona fide pipeline? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 69 , 1013–1027 (1995).

CAS   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Greenwald, A. G. & Banaji, M. R. Implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychol. Rev. 102 , 4–27 (1995).

Amodio, D. M. The social neuroscience of intergroup relations. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 19 , 1–54 (2008).

Ito, T. A. & Bartholow, B. D. The neural correlates of race. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13 , 524–531 (2009). In a field dominated by fMRI studies, this review presents important research on ERP approaches to probing the neural underpinnings of sociocognitive processes involved in prejudice and stereotyping.

PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Kubota, J. T., Banaji, M. R. & Phelps, E. A. The neuroscience of race. Nature Neurosci. 15 , 940–948 (2012).

Amodio, D. M. Can neuroscience advance social psychological theory? Social neuroscience for the behavioral social psychologist. Soc. Cogn. 28 , 695–716 (2010).

Poldrack, R. A. Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data? Trends Cogn. Sci. 10 , 59–63 (2006).

Mackie, D. M. & Smith, E. R. in The Social Self: Cognitive, Interpersonal, and Intergroup Perspectives (eds Forgas, J. P. & Williams, K. D.) 309–326 (Psychology Press, 2002).

Cottrell, C. A. & Neuberg, S. L. Different emotional reactions to different groups: a sociofunctional threat-based approach to “prejudice”. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 88 , 770–789 (2005).

Swanson, L. W. & Petrovich, G. D. What is the amygdala? Trends Neurosci. 21 , 323–331 (1998).

LeDoux, J. E. Emotion circuits in the brain. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 23 , 155–184 (2000).

Davis, M. Neural systems involved in fear and anxiety measured with fear-potentiated startle. Am. Psychol. 61 , 741–756 (2006).

Fendt, M. & Fanselow, M. S. The neuroanatomical and neurochemical basis of conditioned fear. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 23 , 743–760 (1999).

LeDoux, J. E., Iwata, J., Cicchetti, P. & Reis, D. J. Different projections of the central amygdaloid nucleus mediate autonomic and behavioral correlates of conditioned fear. J. Neurosci. 8 , 2517–2529 (1988).

Holland, P. C. & Gallagher, M. Amygdala circuitry in attentional and representational processes. Trends Cogn. Sci. 3 , 65–73 (1999).

Rolls, E. T. & Rolls, B. J. Altered food preferences after lesions in the basolateral region of the amygdala in the rat. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol. 83 , 248–259 (1973).

Adolphs, R. Fear, faces, and the human amygdala. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 18 , 166–172 (2008).

CAS   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Phelps, E. A. et al. Performance on indirect measures of race evaluation predicts amygdala activation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12 , 729–738 (2000). An early fMRI investigation of neural correlates of implicit prejudice, focusing on the amygdala. Relative differences in amygdala activity in response to black compared with white faces were associated with a behavioural index of implicit prejudice and startle responses to black versus white faces.

Hart, A. J. et al. Differential response in the human amygdala to racial outgroup versus ingroup face stimuli. Neuroreport 11 , 2351–2355 (2000).

Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E. & Devine, P. G. Individual differences in the activation and control of affective race bias as assessed by startle eyeblink responses and self-report. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 84 , 738–753 (2003). The first reported difference in amygdala activity in response to black compared with white (and Asian) faces. By using the startle-eyeblink method to assess amygdala activity related to the CeA, the results link implicit prejudice more directly to a Pavlovian conditioning mechanism of learning and behavioural expression.

Amodio, D. M. & Ratner, K. G. A memory systems model of implicit social cognition. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 20 , 143–148 (2011).

Olson, M. A. & Fazio, R. H. Reducing automatically-activated racial prejudice through implicit evaluative conditioning. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 32 , 421–433 (2006).

Kawakami, K., Phills, C. E., Steele, J. R. & Dovidio, J. F. (Close) distance makes the heart grow fonder: improving implicit racial attitudes and interracial interactions through approach behaviors. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 92 , 957–971 (2007).

Amodio, D. M. & Hamilton, H. K. Intergroup anxiety effects on implicit racial evaluation and stereotyping. Emotion 12 , 1273–1280 (2012).

Chekroud, A. M., Everett, J. A. C., Bridge, H. & Hewstone, M. A review of neuroimaging studies of race-related prejudice: does amygdala response reflect threat? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8 , 179 (2014).

Ronquillo, J. et al. The effects of skin tone on race-related amygdala activity: an fMRI investigation. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 2 , 39–44 (2007).

Richeson, J. A., Todd, A. R., Trawalter, S. & Baird, A. A. Eye-gaze direction modulates race-related amygdala activity. Group Process. Interg. Relat. 11 , 233–246 (2008).

Freeman, J. B., Schiller, D., Rule, N. O. & Ambady, N. The neural origins of superficial and individuated judgments about ingroup and outgroup members. Hum. Brain Mapp. 31 , 150–159 (2010).

Forbes, C. E., Cox, C. L., Schmader, T. & Ryan, L. Negative stereotype activation alters interaction between neural correlates of arousal, inhibition, and cognitive control. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7 , 771–781 (2012).

Cunningham, W. A. et al. Separable neural components in the processing of black and white faces. Psychol. Sci. 15 , 806–813 (2004).

Telzer, E. H., Humphreys, K., Shapiro, M. & Tottenham, N. L. Amygdala sensitivity to race is not present in childhood but emerges in adolescence. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 25 , 234–244 (2013).

Cloutier, J., Li, T. & Correll, J. The impact of childhood experience on amygdala response to perceptually familiar black and white faces. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 26 , 1992–2004 (2014).

Olsson, A., Ebert, J. P., Banaji, M. R. & Phelps, E. A. The role of social group in the persistence of learned fear. Science 309 , 785–787 (2005).

Richeson, J. A. & Trawalter, S. The threat of appearing prejudiced and race-based attentional biases. Psychol. Sci. 19 , 98–102 (2008).

Ofan, R. H., Rubin, N. & Amodio, D. M. Situation-based social anxiety enhances the neural processing of faces: evidence from an intergroup context. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst087 (2013).

Plant, E. A. & Devine, P. G. Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 75 , 811–832 (1998).

Stephan, W. G. & Stephan, C. W. Intergroup anxiety. J. Soc. Issues 41 , 157–175 (1985).

Lieberman, M. D., Hariri, A., Jarcho, J. M., Eisenberger, N. I. & Bookheimer, S. Y. An fMRI investigation of race-related amygdala activity in African-American and Caucasian-American individuals. Nature Neurosci. 8 , 720–722 (2005).

Wheeler, M. E. & Fiske, S. T. Controlling racial prejudice: social-cognitive goals affect amygdala and stereotype activation. Psychol. Sci. 16 , 56–63 (2005).

Van Bavel, J. J., Packer, D. J. & Cunningham, W. A. The neural substrates of in-group bias: a functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation. Psychol. Sci. 11 , 1131–1139 (2008). This study compared the independent effects of race and coalition (team membership) on amygdala responses to faces and showed that when team membership was salient, the amygdala responded to coalition (subject's team or other team) and not race (black or white). This finding demonstrated that the amygdala response to race is not inevitable but rather corresponds to the subject's particular task goal.

Richeson, J. A. et al. An fMRI investigation of the impact of interracial contact on executive function. Nature Neurosci. 6 , 1323–1328 (2003).

Gilbert, S. J., Swencionis, J. K. & Amodio, D. M. Evaluative versus trait representation in intergroup social judgments: distinct roles of anterior temporal lobe and prefrontal cortex. Neuropsychologia 50 , 3600–3611 (2012). Using fMRI, the authors distinguished neural processes involved in stereotyping and prejudiced attitudes. Stereotype-based judgements of black compared with white people uniquely involved the mPFC; affect-based judgements uniquely involved the OFC.

Golby, A. J., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Chiao, J. Y. & Eberhardt, J. L. Differential fusiform responses to same- and other-race faces. Nature Neurosci. 4 , 845–850 (2001). The first demonstration of race effects in visual processing, using fMRI. Differences in fusiform responses to black and white faces predicted the degree of 'own race bias' in memory in white subjects.

Knutson, K. M., Mah, L., Manly, C. F. & Grafman, J. Neural correlates of automatic beliefs about gender and race. Hum. Brain Mapp. 28 , 915–930 (2007).

Brosch, T., Bar-David, E. & Phelps, E. A. Implicit race bias decreases the similarity of neural representations of black and white faces. Psychol. Sci. 24 , 160–166 (2013).

Schreiber, D. & Iacoboni, M. Huxtables on the brain: an fMRI study of race and norm violation. Polit. Psychol. 33 , 313–330 (2012).

Whalen, P. J. Fear, vigilance, and ambiguity: initial neuroimaging studies of the human amygdala. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 7 , 177–188 (1998).

Said, C. P., Baron, S. & Todorov, A. Nonlinear amygdala response to face trustworthiness: contributions of high and low spatial frequency information. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21 , 519–528 (2009).

Cunningham, W. A., Van Bavel, J. J. & Johnsen, I. R. Affective flexibility: evaluative processing goals shape amygdala activity. Psychol. Sci. 19 , 152–160 (2008).

Phelps, E. A., Cannistraci, C. J. & Cunningham, W. A. Intact performance on an indirect measure of race bias following amygdala damage. Neuropsychologia 41 , 203–208 (2003).

Bechara, A., Damasio, H. & Damasio, A. R. Emotion, decision making and the orbitofrontal cortex. Cereb. Cortex 10 , 295–307 (2000).

O'Doherty, J., Kringelbach, M. L., Rolls, E. T., Hornak, J. & Andrews, C. Abstract reward and punishment representations in the human orbitofrontal cortex. Nature Neurosci. 4 , 95–102 (2001).

Rushworth, M. F. S., Noonan, M. P., Boorman, E. D., Walton, M. E. & Behrens, T. E. Frontal cortex and reward-guided learning and decision-making. Neuron 70 , 1054–1069 (2011).

Beer, J. S., Heerey, E. H., Keltner, D., Scabini, D. & Knight, R. T. The regulatory function of self-conscious emotion: insights from patients with orbitofrontal damage. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 85 , 594–604 (2003).

Amodio, D. M. & Frith, C. D. Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social cognition. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 7 , 268–277 (2006).

CAS   Google Scholar  

Ongu¨r, D. & Price, J. L. The organization of networks within the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex of rats, monkeys and humans. Cereb. Cortex 10 , 206–219 (2000).

Beer, J. S. et al. The Quadruple Process model approach to examining the neural underpinnings of prejudice. Neuroimage 43 , 775–783 (2008).

Craig, A. D. How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 3 , 655–666 (2002).

Craig, A. D. How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 10 , 59–70 (2009).

Harris, L. T. & Fiske, S. T. Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: neuro-imaging responses to extreme outgroups. Psychol. Sci. 17 , 847–853 (2006).

Singer, T. et al. Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science 303 , 1157–1162 (2004).

Singer, T. et al. Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. Nature 439 , 466–469 (2006).

Lamm, C., Meltzoff, A. N. & Decety, J. How do we empathize with someone who is not like us? A functional magnetic resonance imaging study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22 , 362–376 (2010).

Xu, X., Zuo, X., Wang, X. & Han, S. Do you feel my pain? Racial group membership modulates empathic neural responses. J. Neurosci. 29 , 8525–8529 (2009). In a demonstration of racial bias in empathy, mPFC and ACC activity linked to empathy was observed only when subjects viewed members of their own racial group being exposed to painful stimuli.

Cikara, M. & Fiske, S. T. Bounded empathy: neural responses to outgroup targets' (mis)fortunes. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23 , 3791–3803 (2011).

Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R. & Strick, P. L. Parallel organization of functionally segregated circuits linking basal ganglia and cortex. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 9 , 357–381 (1986).

Knutson, B., Adams, C. S., Fong, G. W. & Hommer, D. Anticipation of monetary reward selectively recruits nucleus accumbens. J. Neurosci. 21 , RC159 (2001).

O'Doherty, J. et al. Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental conditioning. Science 304 , 452–454 (2004).

Stanley, D. A. et al. Race and reputation: perceived racial group trustworthiness influences the neural correlates of trust decisions. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 367 , 744–753 (2012).

Mitchell, J. P., Heatherton, T. F. & Macrae, C. N. Distinct neural systems subserve person and object knowledge. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 99 , 15238–15243 (2002).

Van Overwalle, F. Social cognition and the brain: a meta-analysis. Hum. Brain Mapp. 30 , 829–858 (2009).

Krueger, F., Barbey, A. K. & Grafman, J. The medial prefrontal cortex mediates social event knowledge. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13 , 103–109 (2009).

Frith, C. D. & Frith, U. Interacting minds—a biological basis. Science 286 , 1692–1695 (1999).

Cikara, M., Bruneau, E. G. & Saxe, R. Us and them: intergroup failures of empathy. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 20 , 149–153 (2011).

Cikara, M., Eberhardt, J. L. & Fiske, S. T. From agents to objects: sexist attitudes and neural responses to sexualized targets. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23 , 540–551 (2011).

Hamilton, D. L. & Sherman, J. W. in Handbook of Social Cognition Vol. 2 , 2nd edn (eds Wyer, R. S. Jr & Srull, T. K.) 1–68 (Erlbaum, 1994).

Olson, I. R., McCoy, D., Klobusicky, E. & Ross, L. A. Social cognition and the anterior temporal lobes: a review and theoretical framework. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 8 , 123–133 (2013).

Quadflieg, S. & Macrae, C. N. Stereotypes and stereotyping: what's the brain got to do with it? Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 22 , 215–273 (2011). A comprehensive review of neuroscience research on social stereotyping processes.

Gabrieli, J. D. Cognitive neuroscience of human memory. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 49 , 87–115 (1998).

Martin, A. The representation of object concepts in the brain. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 58 , 25–45 (2007).

Patterson, K., Nestor, P. J. & Rogers, T. T. Where do you know what you know? The representation of semantic knowledge in the human brain. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 8 , 976–987 (2007).

Quadflieg, S. et al. Exploring the neural correlates of social stereotyping. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21 , 1560–1570 (2009).

Olson, I. R., Plotzker, A. & Ezzyat, Y. The enigmatic temporal pole: a review of findings on social and emotional processing. Brain 130 , 1718–1731 (2007).

Zahn, R. et al. Social concepts are represented in the superior anterior temporal cortex. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 104 , 6430–6435 (2007).

de Schotten, M. T., Dell'Acqua, F., Valabregue, R. & Catani, M. Monkey to human comparative anatomy of the frontal lobe association tracts. Cortex 48 , 82–96 (2012).

Contreras, J. M., Banaji, M. R. & Mitchell, J. P. Dissociable neural correlates of stereotypes and other forms of semantic knowledge. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7 , 764–770 (2012). An fMRI study on the neural underpinnings of stereotyping that distinguishes the role of trait inference processes from that of object knowledge representation.

Gallate, J., Wong, C., Ellwood, S., Chi, R. & Snyder, A. Noninvasive brain stimulation reduces prejudice scores on an implicit association test. Neuropsychology 25 , 185–192 (2011).

Milne, E. & Grafman, J. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions in humans eliminate implicit gender stereotyping. J. Neurosci. 21 , 1–6 (2001).

Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N. & Banaji, M. R. Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. Neuron 50 , 655–663 (2006).

Quadflieg, S. et al. Stereotype-based modulation of person perception. Neuroimage 57 , 549–557 (2011).

Forbes, C. E. et al. Identifying temporal and causal contributions of neural processes underlying the Implicit Association Test. (IAT). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6 , 320 (2012).

Mitchell, J. P. Social psychology as a natural kind. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13 , 246–251 (2009).

Gilbert, S. J. et al. Distinct regions of medial rostral prefrontal cortex supporting social and nonsocial functions. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 2 , 217–226 (2007).

Baetens, K., Ma, N., Steen, J. & van Overwalle, F. Involvement of the mentalizing network in social and non-social high construal. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 9 , 817–824 (2014).

Saxe, R. Uniquely human social cognition. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 16 , 235–239 (2006).

Frith, C. D. & Frith, U. Implicit and explicit processes in social cognition. Neuron 60 , 503–510 (2008).

Uddin, L. Q., Iacoboni, M., Lange, C. & Keenan, J. P. The self and social cognition: the role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11 , 153–157 (2007).

Blaxton, T. A. et al. Functional mapping of human memory using PET: comparisons of conceptual and perceptual tasks. Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 50 , 42–56 (1996).

Buckner, R. L. & Tulving, E. in Handbook of Neuropsychology Vol. 10 (eds Boller, F. & Grafman, J.) 439–466 (Elsevier, 1995).

Demb, J. B. et al. Semantic encoding and retrieval in the left inferior prefrontal cortex: a functional MRI study of task difficulty and process specificity. J. Neurosci. 15 , 5870–5878 (1995).

Thompson-Schill, S. L. Neuroimaging studies of semantic memory: inferring “how” from “where”. Neuropsychologia 41 , 280–292 (2003).

Miller, E. K., Freedman, D. J. & Wallis, J. D. The prefrontal cortex: categories, concepts and cognition. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 357 , 1123–1136 (2002).

Balleine, B. W., Delgado, M. R. & Hikosaka, O. The role of the dorsal striatum in reward and decision-making. J. Neurosci. 27 , 8161–8165 (2007).

Mitchell, J. P., Ames, D. L., Jenkins, A. C. & Banaji, M. R. Neural correlates of stereotype application. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21 , 594–604 (2009).

Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W. & Poldrack, R. A. Inhibition and the right inferior frontal cortex. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8 , 170–177 (2004).

Bodenhausen, G. V., Sheppard, L. & Kramer, G. P. Negative affect and social perception: the differential impact of anger and sadness. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 24 , 45–62 (1994).

DeSteno, D., Dasgupta, N., Bartlett, M. Y. & Cajdric, A. Prejudice from thin air: the effect of emotion on automatic intergroup attitudes. Psychol. Sci. 15 , 319–324 (2004).

Choi, E. Y., Yeo, B. T. & Buckner, R. L. The organization of the human striatum estimated by intrinsic functional connectivity. J. Neurophysiol. 108 , 2242–2263 (2012).

Bush, G., Luu, P. & Posner, M. L. Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior cingulate cortex. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4 , 215–222 (2000).

Mansouri, F. A., Tanaka, K. & Buckley, M. J. Conflict-induced behavioral adjustment: a clue to the executive functions of the prefrontal cortex. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 10 , 141–152 (2009).

Gerhing, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., Meyer, D. E. & Donchin, E. A neural system for error detection and compensation. Psychol. Sci. 4 , 385–390 (1993).

Botvinick, M., Nystrom, L., Fissell, K., Carter, C. & Cohen, J. Conflict monitoring versus selection-for-action in anterior cingulate cortex. Nature 402 , 179–181 (1999).

Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S. & Cohen, J. D. Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108 , 624–652 (2001).

Shackman, A. J. et al. The integration of negative affect, pain and cognitive control in the cingulate cortex. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 12 , 154–167 (2011).

Amodio, D. M. & Devine, P. G. in Self Control in Society, Mind and Brain (eds Hassin, R. R., Ochsner, K. N. & Trope, Y.). 49–75 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).

Amodio, D. M. et al. Neural signals for the detection of unintentional race bias. Psychol. Sci. 15 , 88–93 (2004). This study demonstrated the role of the ACC in the control of racial bias. Using ERPs, the authors found an increase ACC activity to stereotype-based conflict that predicted enhanced control of bias in behaviour.

Amodio, D. M., Kubota, J. T., Harmon-Jones, E. & Devine, P. G. Alternative mechanisms for regulating racial responses according to internal versus external cues. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 1 , 26–36 (2006).

Amodio, D. M., Devine, P. G. & Harmon-Jones, E. Individual differences in the regulation of intergroup bias: the role of conflict monitoring and neural signals for control. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 94 , 60–74 (2008).

Bartholow, B. D., Dickter, C. L. & Sestir, M. A. Stereotype activation and control of race bias: cognitive control of inhibition and its impairment by alcohol. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 90 , 272–287 (2006).

Correll, J., Urland, G. R. & Ito, T. A. Event-related potentials and the decision to shoot: the role of threat perception and cognitive control. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 42 , 120–128 (2006).

Gonsalkorale, K., Sherman, J. W., Allen, T. J., Klauer, K. C. & Amodio, D. M. Accounting for successful control of implicit racial bias: the roles of association activation, response monitoring, and overcoming bias. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 37 , 1534–1545 (2011).

Fourie, M. M., Thomas, K. G. F., Amodio, D. M., Warton, C. M. R. & Meintjes, E. M. Neural correlates of experienced moral emotion: an fMRI investigation of emotion in response to prejudice feedback. Soc. Neurosci. 9 , 203–218 (2014).

Van Nunspeet, F., Ellemers, N., Derks, B. & Nieuwenhuis, S. Moral concerns increase attention and response monitoring during IAT performance: ERP evidence. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 9 , 141–149 (2014).

Fuster, J. M. The prefrontal cortex—an update: time is of the essence. Neuron 2 , 319–333 (2001).

Badre, D. & D'Esposito, M. Is the rostro–caudal axis of the frontal lobe hierarchical? Nature Rev. Neurosci. 10 , 659–669 (2009).

Koechlin, E., Ody, C. & Kouneiher, F. The architecture of cognitive control in the human prefrontal cortex. Science 302 , 1181–1185 (2003).

Aron, A. R. The neural basis of inhibition in cognitive control. Neuroscientist 13 , 214–228 (2007).

Ghashghaei, H. T., Hilgetag, C. C. & Barbas, H. Sequence of information processing for emotions based on the anatomic dialogue between prefrontal cortex and amygdala. Neuroimage 34 , 905–923 (2007).

Amodio, D. M. Coordinated roles of motivation and perception in the regulation of intergroup responses: frontal cortical asymmetry effects on the P2 event-related potential and behavior. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22 , 2609–2617 (2010). This study demonstrated the role of the PFC in the behavioural control of racial bias and showed that this effect involves changes in early perceptual attention to racial cues. The study provided initial evidence for a 'motivated perception' account of self-regulation.

Amodio, D. M., Devine, P. G. & Harmon-Jones, E. A dynamic model of guilt: implications for motivation and self-regulation in the context of prejudice. Psychol. Sci. 18 , 524–530 (2007).

Gozzi, M., Raymont, V., Solomon, J., Koenigs, M. & Grafman, J. Dissociable effects of prefrontal and anterior temporal cortical lesions on stereotypical gender attitudes. Neuropsychologia 47 , 2125–2132 (2009).

Milad, M. R. & Quirk, G. J. Neurons in medial prefrontal cortex signal memory for fear extinction. Nature 420 , 70–74 (2002).

Sloman, S. A. The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychol. Bull. 119 , 3–22 (1996).

Kawakami, K., Dovidio, J. F., Moll, J., Hermsen, S. & Russin, A. Just say no (to stereotyping): effects of training on the negation of stereotypic associations on stereotype activation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 78 , 871–888 (2000).

Mallan, K. M., Sax, J. & Lipp, O. V. Verbal instruction abolishes fear conditioned to racial out-group faces. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 45 , 1303–1307 (2009).

Bouton, M. E. Conditioning, remembering, and forgetting. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. B 20 , 219–231 (1994).

Devine, P. G., Plant, E. A., Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E. & Vance, S. L. The regulation of explicit and implicit racial bias: the role of motivations to respond without prejudice. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 82 , 835–848 (2002).

Kleiman, T., Hassin, R. R. & Trope, Y. The control-freak mind: stereotypical biases are eliminated following conflict-activated cognitive control. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 143 , 498–503 (2014).

Monteith, M. J., Ashburn-Nardo, L., Voils, C. I. & Czopp, A. M. Putting the brakes on prejudice: on the development and operation of cues for control. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 83 , 1029–1050 (2002).

Mendoza, S. A., Gollwitzer, P. M. & Amodio, D. M. Reducing the expression of implicit stereotypes: reflexive control through implementation intentions. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 36 , 512–523 (2010).

Bar, M. et al. Top-down facilitation of visual recognition. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 103 , 449–454 (2006).

Van Bavel, J. J., Packer, D. J. & Cunningham, W. A. Modulation of the fusiform face area following minimal exposure to motivationally relevant faces: evidence of in-group enhancement (not out-group disregard). J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23 , 3343–3354 (2011).

Ratner, K. G., Dotsch, R., Wigboldus, D., van Knippenberg, A. & Amodio, D. M. Visualizing minimal ingroup and outgroup faces: implications for impressions, attitudes, and behavior. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 106 , 897–911 (2014).

Krosch, A. K. & Amodio, D. M. Economic scarcity alters the perception of race. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 111 , 9079–9084 (2014).

Ofan, R. H., Rubin, N. & Amodio, D. M. Seeing race: N170 responses to race and their relation to automatic racial attitudes and controlled processing. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23 , 3152–3161 (2011).

Brebner, J. L., Krigolson, O., Handy, T. C., Quadflieg, S. & Turk, D. J. The importance of skin color and facial structure in perceiving and remembering others: an electro-physiological study. Brain Res. 1388 , 123–133 (2011).

Caldara, R., Rossion, B., Bovet, P. & Hauert, C. A. Event-related potentials and time course of the 'other-race' face classification advantage. Neuroreport 15 , 905–910 (2004).

Caldara, R. et al. Face versus non-face object perception and the 'other-race' effect: a spatiotemporal event-related potential study. Clin. Neurophysiol. 114 , 515–528 (2003).

Ito, T. A. & Urland, G. R. The influence of processing objectives on the perception of faces: an ERP study of race and gender perception. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 5 , 21–36 (2005).

Walker, P. M., Silvert, L., Hewstone, M. & Nobre, A. C. Social contact and other-race face processing in the human brain. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 3 , 16–25 (2008).

Wiese, H., Stahl, J. & Schweinberger, S. R. Configural processing of other-race faces is delayed but not decreased. Biol. Psychol. 81 , 103–109 (2009).

Contreras, J. M., Banaji, M. R. & Mitchell, J. P. Multivoxel patterns in fusiform face area differentiate faces by sex and race. PLoS ONE 8 , e69684 (2013).

Ratner, K. G., Kaul, C. & Van Bavel, J. J. Is race erased? Decoding race from patterns of neural activity when skin color is not diagnostic of group boundaries. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 8 , 750–755 (2013).

Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. & Banaji, M. R. Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. meta-analysis of predictive validity. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 97 , 17–41 (2009).

Payne, B. K. Prejudice and perception: the role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 81 , 181–192 (2001).

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E. & Schwartz, J. K. L. Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: the Implicit Association Test. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 74 , 1464–1480 (1998).

Download references

Acknowledgements

Work on this article was supported by a National Science Foundation grant (BCS 0847350). The author thanks members of the NYU Social Neuroscience Laboratory, J. Freeman, K. Ratner and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, 10003, New York, USA

David M. Amodio

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to David M. Amodio .

Ethics declarations

Competing interests.

The author declares no competing financial interests.

PowerPoint slides

Powerpoint slide for fig. 1, powerpoint slide for fig. 2, powerpoint slide for fig. 3, powerpoint slide for fig. 4, powerpoint slide for fig. 5.

Motives that operate in social contexts and satisfy basic, often universal, goals and aspirations, such as to affiliate (for example, form relationships and communities) or to achieve dominance (for example, within a social hierarchy).

Conceptual attributes associated with a group and its members (often through over-generalization), which may refer to trait or circumstantial characteristics.

Evaluations of or affective responses towards a social group and its members based on preconceptions.

The process of responding in an intentional manner, often involving the inhibition or overriding of an alternative response tendency.

The visual encoding of a face in terms of its basic structural characteristics (for example, the eyes, nose, mouth and the relative distances between these elements). Configural encoding may be contrasted with featural encoding, which refers to the encoding of feature characteristics that make an individual's face unique.

Actions performed to achieve a desired outcome (that is, goal-directed responses).

Prejudiced or stereotype-based perceptions or responses that operate without conscious awareness.

Judgements that result from thoughtful considerations (often involving cognitive control) as opposed to rapid, gut-level, 'snap' judgements.

(ERP). An electrical signal produced by summated postsynaptic potentials of cortical neurons in response to a discrete event, such as a stimulus or a response in an experimental task. Typically recorded from the scalp in humans, ERPs can be measured with extremely high temporal resolution and can be used to track rapid, real-time changes in neural activity.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article.

Amodio, D. The neuroscience of prejudice and stereotyping. Nat Rev Neurosci 15 , 670–682 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3800

Download citation

Published : 04 September 2014

Issue Date : October 2014

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3800

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

This article is cited by

Causation in neuroscience: keeping mechanism meaningful.

• Lauren N. Ross
• Dani S. Bassett

Nature Reviews Neuroscience (2024)

Implicit racial biases are lower in more populous more diverse and less segregated US cities

• Andrew J. Stier
• Sina Sajjadi
• Marc G. Berman

Nature Communications (2024)

The Role of Affective Empathy in Eliminating Discrimination Against Women: a Conceptual Proposition

• Michaela Guthridge
• Tania Penovic
• Melita J. Giummarra

Human Rights Review (2023)

Beyond Dehumanized Gender Identity: Critical Reflection on Neuroscience, Power Relationship and Law

• Chetan Sinha

Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science (2023)

Mechanisms of action for stigma reduction among primary care providers following social contact with service users and aspirational figures in Nepal: an explanatory qualitative design

• Bonnie N. Kaiser
• Dristy Gurung
• Brandon A. Kohrt

International Journal of Mental Health Systems (2022)

Quick links

• Explore articles by subject
• Guide to authors
• Editorial policies

Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.

1 Introduction to Critical Thinking

I. what is c ritical t hinking [1].

Critical thinking is the ability to think clearly and rationally about what to do or what to believe.  It includes the ability to engage in reflective and independent thinking. Someone with critical thinking skills is able to do the following:

• Understand the logical connections between ideas.
• Identify, construct, and evaluate arguments.
• Detect inconsistencies and common mistakes in reasoning.
• Solve problems systematically.
• Identify the relevance and importance of ideas.
• Reflect on the justification of one’s own beliefs and values.

Critical thinking is not simply a matter of accumulating information. A person with a good memory and who knows a lot of facts is not necessarily good at critical thinking. Critical thinkers are able to deduce consequences from what they know, make use of information to solve problems, and to seek relevant sources of information to inform themselves.

Critical thinking should not be confused with being argumentative or being critical of other people. Although critical thinking skills can be used in exposing fallacies and bad reasoning, critical thinking can also play an important role in cooperative reasoning and constructive tasks. Critical thinking can help us acquire knowledge, improve our theories, and strengthen arguments. We can also use critical thinking to enhance work processes and improve social institutions.

Some people believe that critical thinking hinders creativity because critical thinking requires following the rules of logic and rationality, whereas creativity might require breaking those rules. This is a misconception. Critical thinking is quite compatible with thinking “out-of-the-box,” challenging consensus views, and pursuing less popular approaches. If anything, critical thinking is an essential part of creativity because we need critical thinking to evaluate and improve our creative ideas.

II. The I mportance of C ritical T hinking

Critical thinking is a domain-general thinking skill. The ability to think clearly and rationally is important whatever we choose to do. If you work in education, research, finance, management or the legal profession, then critical thinking is obviously important. But critical thinking skills are not restricted to a particular subject area. Being able to think well and solve problems systematically is an asset for any career.

Critical thinking is very important in the new knowledge economy.  The global knowledge economy is driven by information and technology. One has to be able to deal with changes quickly and effectively. The new economy places increasing demands on flexible intellectual skills, and the ability to analyze information and integrate diverse sources of knowledge in solving problems. Good critical thinking promotes such thinking skills, and is very important in the fast-changing workplace.

Critical thinking enhances language and presentation skills. Thinking clearly and systematically can improve the way we express our ideas. In learning how to analyze the logical structure of texts, critical thinking also improves comprehension abilities.

Critical thinking promotes creativity. To come up with a creative solution to a problem involves not just having new ideas. It must also be the case that the new ideas being generated are useful and relevant to the task at hand. Critical thinking plays a crucial role in evaluating new ideas, selecting the best ones and modifying them if necessary.

Critical thinking is crucial for self-reflection. In order to live a meaningful life and to structure our lives accordingly, we need to justify and reflect on our values and decisions. Critical thinking provides the tools for this process of self-evaluation.

Good critical thinking is the foundation of science and democracy. Science requires the critical use of reason in experimentation and theory confirmation. The proper functioning of a liberal democracy requires citizens who can think critically about social issues to inform their judgments about proper governance and to overcome biases and prejudice.

Critical thinking is a   metacognitive skill . What this means is that it is a higher-level cognitive skill that involves thinking about thinking. We have to be aware of the good principles of reasoning, and be reflective about our own reasoning. In addition, we often need to make a conscious effort to improve ourselves, avoid biases, and maintain objectivity. This is notoriously hard to do. We are all able to think but to think well often requires a long period of training. The mastery of critical thinking is similar to the mastery of many other skills. There are three important components: theory, practice, and attitude.

III. Improv ing O ur T hinking S kills

If we want to think correctly, we need to follow the correct rules of reasoning. Knowledge of theory includes knowledge of these rules. These are the basic principles of critical thinking, such as the laws of logic, and the methods of scientific reasoning, etc.

Also, it would be useful to know something about what not to do if we want to reason correctly. This means we should have some basic knowledge of the mistakes that people make. First, this requires some knowledge of typical fallacies. Second, psychologists have discovered persistent biases and limitations in human reasoning. An awareness of these empirical findings will alert us to potential problems.

However, merely knowing the principles that distinguish good and bad reasoning is not enough. We might study in the classroom about how to swim, and learn about the basic theory, such as the fact that one should not breathe underwater. But unless we can apply such theoretical knowledge through constant practice, we might not actually be able to swim.

Similarly, to be good at critical thinking skills it is necessary to internalize the theoretical principles so that we can actually apply them in daily life. There are at least two ways to do this. One is to perform lots of quality exercises. These exercises don’t just include practicing in the classroom or receiving tutorials; they also include engaging in discussions and debates with other people in our daily lives, where the principles of critical thinking can be applied. The second method is to think more deeply about the principles that we have acquired. In the human mind, memory and understanding are acquired through making connections between ideas.

Good critical thinking skills require more than just knowledge and practice. Persistent practice can bring about improvements only if one has the right kind of motivation and attitude. The following attitudes are not uncommon, but they are obstacles to critical thinking:

• I prefer being given the correct answers rather than figuring them out myself.
• I don’t like to think a lot about my decisions as I rely only on gut feelings.
• I don’t usually review the mistakes I have made.
• I don’t like to be criticized.

To improve our thinking we have to recognize the importance of reflecting on the reasons for belief and action. We should also be willing to engage in debate, break old habits, and deal with linguistic complexities and abstract concepts.

The  California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory  is a psychological test that is used to measure whether people are disposed to think critically. It measures the seven different thinking habits listed below, and it is useful to ask ourselves to what extent they describe the way we think:

• Truth-Seeking—Do you try to understand how things really are? Are you interested in finding out the truth?
• Open-Mindedness—How receptive are you to new ideas, even when you do not intuitively agree with them? Do you give new concepts a fair hearing?
• Analyticity—Do you try to understand the reasons behind things? Do you act impulsively or do you evaluate the pros and cons of your decisions?
• Systematicity—Are you systematic in your thinking? Do you break down a complex problem into parts?
• Confidence in Reasoning—Do you always defer to other people? How confident are you in your own judgment? Do you have reasons for your confidence? Do you have a way to evaluate your own thinking?
• Inquisitiveness—Are you curious about unfamiliar topics and resolving complicated problems? Will you chase down an answer until you find it?
• Maturity of Judgment—Do you jump to conclusions? Do you try to see things from different perspectives? Do you take other people’s experiences into account?

Finally, as mentioned earlier, psychologists have discovered over the years that human reasoning can be easily affected by a variety of cognitive biases. For example, people tend to be over-confident of their abilities and focus too much on evidence that supports their pre-existing opinions. We should be alert to these biases in our attitudes towards our own thinking.

IV. Defining Critical Thinking

There are many different definitions of critical thinking. Here we list some of the well-known ones. You might notice that they all emphasize the importance of clarity and rationality. Here we will look at some well-known definitions in chronological order.

1) Many people trace the importance of critical thinking in education to the early twentieth-century American philosopher John Dewey. But Dewey did not make very extensive use of the term “critical thinking.” Instead, in his book  How We Think (1910), he argued for the importance of what he called “reflective thinking”:

…[when] the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the belief examined. This process is called reflective thought; it alone is truly educative in value…

Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought.

There is however one passage from How We Think where Dewey explicitly uses the term “critical thinking”:

The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment; and the essence of this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature of the problem before proceeding to attempts at its solution. This, more than any other thing, transforms mere inference into tested inference, suggested conclusions into proof.

2) The  Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal  (1980) is a well-known psychological test of critical thinking ability. The authors of this test define critical thinking as:

…a composite of attitudes, knowledge and skills. This composite includes: (1) attitudes of inquiry that involve an ability to recognize the existence of problems and an acceptance of the general need for evidence in support of what is asserted to be true; (2) knowledge of the nature of valid inferences, abstractions, and generalizations in which the weight or accuracy of different kinds of evidence are logically determined; and (3) skills in employing and applying the above attitudes and knowledge.

3) A very well-known and influential definition of critical thinking comes from philosopher and professor Robert Ennis in his work “A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities” (1987):

Critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do.

4) The following definition comes from a statement written in 1987 by the philosophers Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the  National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking (link), an organization promoting critical thinking in the US:

Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness. It entails the examination of those structures or elements of thought implicit in all reasoning: purpose, problem, or question-at-issue, assumptions, concepts, empirical grounding; reasoning leading to conclusions, implications and consequences, objections from alternative viewpoints, and frame of reference.

The following excerpt from Peter A. Facione’s “Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction” (1990) is quoted from a report written for the American Philosophical Association:

We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based. CT is essential as a tool of inquiry. As such, CT is a liberating force in education and a powerful resource in one’s personal and civic life. While not synonymous with good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-rectifying human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fairminded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit. Thus, educating good critical thinkers means working toward this ideal. It combines developing CT skills with nurturing those dispositions which consistently yield useful insights and which are the basis of a rational and democratic society.

V. Two F eatures of C ritical T hinking

A. how not what .

Critical thinking is concerned not with what you believe, but rather how or why you believe it. Most classes, such as those on biology or chemistry, teach you what to believe about a subject matter. In contrast, critical thinking is not particularly interested in what the world is, in fact, like. Rather, critical thinking will teach you how to form beliefs and how to think. It is interested in the type of reasoning you use when you form your beliefs, and concerns itself with whether you have good reasons to believe what you believe. Therefore, this class isn’t a class on the psychology of reasoning, which brings us to the second important feature of critical thinking.

B. Ought N ot Is ( or Normative N ot Descriptive )

There is a difference between normative and descriptive theories. Descriptive theories, such as those provided by physics, provide a picture of how the world factually behaves and operates. In contrast, normative theories, such as those provided by ethics or political philosophy, provide a picture of how the world should be. Rather than ask question such as why something is the way it is, normative theories ask how something should be. In this course, we will be interested in normative theories that govern our thinking and reasoning. Therefore, we will not be interested in how we actually reason, but rather focus on how we ought to reason.

In the introduction to this course we considered a selection task with cards that must be flipped in order to check the validity of a rule. We noted that many people fail to identify all the cards required to check the rule. This is how people do in fact reason (descriptive). We then noted that you must flip over two cards. This is how people ought to reason (normative).

• Section I-IV are taken from http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/ and are in use under the creative commons license. Some modifications have been made to the original content. ↵

Critical Thinking Copyright © 2019 by Brian Kim is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Share This Book

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

Critical Thinking and the Psycho-logic of Race Prejudice. Resource Publication Series 3, No. 1

Related Papers

Mark Weinstein

Harvey Siegel

Educational Theory

Sharon Bailin

Yvonne Wells

In response to conversations of Psychology teachers in Volume of Pedagogy and the Human Sciences (2009), Michael DeCesare (2009) called for more specific definitions of the term“critical thinking". DeCesare questioned methods of stimulating critical thinking in the classroom that might frustrate students of psychology without furthering their learning.DeCesare also appeared to view political realities in the academy as less relevant to the teaching of diversity courses than to the personal experiences of teachers. DeCesare seems to the present authors to believe that students should be moved or transformed to engage in social change through their courses in psychology. For DeCesare the process of learning facts appears to precede the process of critical thinking about psychology. Thus, the present authors have been presented with a challenge to show that there is a pedagogically practical and useful realm of “critical thinking” that can take place along with “factual” empirical...

Peter A Facione

tony Winter

Understanding; and where necessary resisting, everyday forms of persuasion designed to serve detriments on the individual. Seeing how the abuse of semantics in naming them benefits; to maintain a feel good factor, is totally unacceptable form of living an illusion that serves the interests of power and money.

Heidi Hyytinen

The central purpose of this doctoral thesis has been to deepen our understanding of the nature of critical thinking by combining theoretical, empirical and methodological perspectives. The concept of critical thinking has a central role both in research on the philosophy of education and in empirical research on learning and teaching in higher education. Although it is true that the philosophical and empirical analyses of critical thinking and knowledge differ fundamentally, the present thesis argues that there are shared concerns between these two scholarly traditions. The thesis consists of four studies, each of which approached this aim from different viewpoints. The methods involved both a philosophical approach and an empirical multi-method approach. The dialogue between the empirical and theoretical analyses offers new insights into conceptualising critical thinking and its prerequisites and extends our understanding of variations in critical thinking. Based on the theoretical...

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

RELATED PAPERS

Review of General Psychology

Stephen Yanchar

Contemporary Philosophies and Theories in Education

Alessia Marabini

Mark Battersby

Rebecca Tallent

Alessandra Imperio

Informal Logic

Jeffrey Maynes

New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development

Theory and Research in Education

Henri Pettersson

American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences

MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ ALI

Educational Philosophy and Theory

Jennifer W Mulnix

Pedagogy: Critical Approaches To Teaching Literature, Language, Composition, and Culture

Miriam Clark

Saleh Al-Busaidi

Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon

Pedagogy and the Human Sciences

Matthew H. Bowker (M.H. Bowker) , K. Patrick Fazioli

Shannon Pennell

CEPS Journal

Tesol Quart

Dwight Atkinson

Jamie Sewell

Charles Blatz

Cristiane Gottschalk

Frank Zenker

Gary Richmond

Argumentation

Studies in Higher Education 38, 4: pp 506-522

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

Have a language expert improve your writing

Run a free plagiarism check in 10 minutes, generate accurate citations for free.

• Knowledge Base
• Working with sources
• What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

Published on May 30, 2022 by Eoghan Ryan . Revised on May 31, 2023.

Critical thinking is the ability to effectively analyze information and form a judgment .

To think critically, you must be aware of your own biases and assumptions when encountering information, and apply consistent standards when evaluating sources .

Critical thinking skills help you to:

• Identify credible sources
• Evaluate and respond to arguments
• Assess alternative viewpoints
• Test hypotheses against relevant criteria

Table of contents

Why is critical thinking important, critical thinking examples, how to think critically, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about critical thinking.

Critical thinking is important for making judgments about sources of information and forming your own arguments. It emphasizes a rational, objective, and self-aware approach that can help you to identify credible sources and strengthen your conclusions.

Critical thinking is important in all disciplines and throughout all stages of the research process . The types of evidence used in the sciences and in the humanities may differ, but critical thinking skills are relevant to both.

In academic writing , critical thinking can help you to determine whether a source:

• Is free from research bias
• Provides evidence to support its research findings
• Considers alternative viewpoints

Outside of academia, critical thinking goes hand in hand with information literacy to help you form opinions rationally and engage independently and critically with popular media.

Scribbr Citation Checker New

The AI-powered Citation Checker helps you avoid common mistakes such as:

• Missing commas and periods
• Incorrect usage of “et al.”
• Ampersands (&) in narrative citations
• Missing reference entries

Critical thinking can help you to identify reliable sources of information that you can cite in your research paper . It can also guide your own research methods and inform your own arguments.

Outside of academia, critical thinking can help you to be aware of both your own and others’ biases and assumptions.

Academic examples

However, when you compare the findings of the study with other current research, you determine that the results seem improbable. You analyze the paper again, consulting the sources it cites.

You notice that the research was funded by the pharmaceutical company that created the treatment. Because of this, you view its results skeptically and determine that more independent research is necessary to confirm or refute them. Example: Poor critical thinking in an academic context You’re researching a paper on the impact wireless technology has had on developing countries that previously did not have large-scale communications infrastructure. You read an article that seems to confirm your hypothesis: the impact is mainly positive. Rather than evaluating the research methodology, you accept the findings uncritically.

Nonacademic examples

However, you decide to compare this review article with consumer reviews on a different site. You find that these reviews are not as positive. Some customers have had problems installing the alarm, and some have noted that it activates for no apparent reason.

You revisit the original review article. You notice that the words “sponsored content” appear in small print under the article title. Based on this, you conclude that the review is advertising and is therefore not an unbiased source. Example: Poor critical thinking in a nonacademic context You support a candidate in an upcoming election. You visit an online news site affiliated with their political party and read an article that criticizes their opponent. The article claims that the opponent is inexperienced in politics. You accept this without evidence, because it fits your preconceptions about the opponent.

There is no single way to think critically. How you engage with information will depend on the type of source you’re using and the information you need.

However, you can engage with sources in a systematic and critical way by asking certain questions when you encounter information. Like the CRAAP test , these questions focus on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

When encountering information, ask:

• Who is the author? Are they an expert in their field?
• What do they say? Is their argument clear? Can you summarize it?
• When did they say this? Is the source current?
• Where is the information published? Is it an academic article? Is it peer-reviewed ?
• Why did the author publish it? What is their motivation?
• How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence? Does it rely on opinion, speculation, or appeals to emotion ? Do they address alternative arguments?

Critical thinking also involves being aware of your own biases, not only those of others. When you make an argument or draw your own conclusions, you can ask similar questions about your own writing:

• Am I only considering evidence that supports my preconceptions?
• Is my argument expressed clearly and backed up with credible sources?
• Would I be convinced by this argument coming from someone else?

If you want to know more about ChatGPT, AI tools , citation , and plagiarism , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

• ChatGPT vs human editor
• ChatGPT citations
• Is ChatGPT trustworthy?
• Using ChatGPT for your studies
• What is ChatGPT?
• Chicago style
• Paraphrasing

 Plagiarism

• Types of plagiarism
• Self-plagiarism
• Avoiding plagiarism
• Academic integrity
• Consequences of plagiarism
• Common knowledge

Critical thinking refers to the ability to evaluate information and to be aware of biases or assumptions, including your own.

Like information literacy , it involves evaluating arguments, identifying and solving problems in an objective and systematic way, and clearly communicating your ideas.

Critical thinking skills include the ability to:

You can assess information and arguments critically by asking certain questions about the source. You can use the CRAAP test , focusing on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

Ask questions such as:

• Who is the author? Are they an expert?
• How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence?

A credible source should pass the CRAAP test  and follow these guidelines:

• The information should be up to date and current.
• The author and publication should be a trusted authority on the subject you are researching.
• The sources the author cited should be easy to find, clear, and unbiased.
• For a web source, the URL and layout should signify that it is trustworthy.

Information literacy refers to a broad range of skills, including the ability to find, evaluate, and use sources of information effectively.

Being information literate means that you:

• Know how to find credible sources
• Use relevant sources to inform your research
• Understand what constitutes plagiarism
• Know how to cite your sources correctly

Confirmation bias is the tendency to search, interpret, and recall information in a way that aligns with our pre-existing values, opinions, or beliefs. It refers to the ability to recollect information best when it amplifies what we already believe. Relatedly, we tend to forget information that contradicts our opinions.

Although selective recall is a component of confirmation bias, it should not be confused with recall bias.

On the other hand, recall bias refers to the differences in the ability between study participants to recall past events when self-reporting is used. This difference in accuracy or completeness of recollection is not related to beliefs or opinions. Rather, recall bias relates to other factors, such as the length of the recall period, age, and the characteristics of the disease under investigation.

Cite this Scribbr article

If you want to cite this source, you can copy and paste the citation or click the “Cite this Scribbr article” button to automatically add the citation to our free Citation Generator.

Ryan, E. (2023, May 31). What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples. Scribbr. Retrieved August 26, 2024, from https://www.scribbr.com/working-with-sources/critical-thinking/

Is this article helpful?

Eoghan Ryan

Other students also liked, student guide: information literacy | meaning & examples, what are credible sources & how to spot them | examples, applying the craap test & evaluating sources, get unlimited documents corrected.

✔ Free APA citation check included ✔ Unlimited document corrections ✔ Specialized in correcting academic texts

Prejudice: Can We Stop the "Inevitable"?

Are we doomed to dislike each other, or does psychology offer hope.

Posted January 19, 2021 | Reviewed by Matt Huston

Welcome to this new blog on Strategies to Oppose Prejudice (STOP).

Prejudice, literally pre-judgement, is a complicated business, and some would argue that prejudice is inevitable. For example, Amodio and Cikara (2021) suggest "the mere existence of group categories creates prejudice". Proponents of this view might draw on many arguments. Economically, it surely makes sense for people to act in their own or their group’s interests. Some people would argue that, from an evolutionary standpoint, it seems only natural that people would defend their genetic legacy. Preferring their own groups, be that their family, clan, community or country, would be a first priority (see Choi & Bowles, 2007, Van Vugt & Park, 2009; Yamagishi et al, 1999).

Even our cognitive architecture makes it inevitable that we will employ stereotypes (simplified images) of social groups in order to navigate our social world (Stangor, 2016). Finally, the values, mores, and beliefs that are embedded in culture give us ways to understand the world that are sustained by social reinforcement and usage (Fiske, 2017). To abandon them or reject them would be like attempting to reject the language of social life and speak instead in machine code.

Many scientists who might agree with any of the arguments above would also agree that, nevertheless, we should do all we can to prevent prejudice, reduce inequality, and eliminate discrimination based on group membership. But isn’t this like saying ‘all people breath air, though we wish they didn’t have to’? If theories and evidence lead us toward the view that prejudice is inevitable, should we really try to work against human nature? And if we really want to achieve that, how on earth can we do so?

As the world becomes more populous, we face a widening number of existential crises. The current pandemic is just one, but others include the growing global competition for natural resources, the climate catastrophe, mass migration, dislocation and poverty, and interethnic and inter-faith battles for power and domination. To navigate these challenges, all of which could be viewed as ‘natural’ consequences of human life, we have developed systems of governance, from local to international levels. Granted, the systems are far from perfect, and sometimes quite corrupt. But the point is that we have not allowed the possibility that there is a ‘natural’ order to deter us from choosing something different. Nor do we need to do so with prejudice.

In fact, the case for opposing prejudice can be seen as integral to the case for addressing all of these other challenges. As the USA marks Martin Luther King Jr. Day and heralds the transition to a new presidency, it seems a good time to renew our focus on creating the conditions that will ensure not just our biological but also our social survival as a species. In order to achieve cross-national collaboration on climate, health and the economy, it is necessary to have confidence that others will cooperate and will not take advantage (e.g., on climate change protocols). In order to cooperate to defeat a pandemic is it necessary to suspend beliefs that certain groups or countries are more blameworthy, or more susceptible, or less important than others. Instead we have to recognise the common purpose, common experience and shared value in getting it under control. To tackle illegal immigration requires that we recognise the root causes rather than resorting just to blaming 'bad' people and blocking borders.

Ironic as it may seem, in order to oppose prejudice we need to recognise that the answer is not to suppress our psychology, but to use it more effectively and to understand better how people's relationships and social situation create frameworks for their attitudes, feelings, and actions towards their own and other groups.

Mask wearers and mask refusers may view one another with disdain but both feel they are expressing their own values honestly. Their antipathy is unlikely to be resolved and behavior unlikely to change merely by declaring one group to be the victor.

Some prejudices are more benign than others – why shouldn’t we approve of people who create beauty, why shouldn’t we prefer some musical styles, why shouldn’t we justify our preferences by overtly valuing some things more than others? Why shouldn’t we be able to disagree respectfully, and most importantly, why shouldn’t we be able to change our minds?

A first step is that we need a working definition of prejudice that allows these normal and functional preferences but does not underpin discrimination and human suffering. A decade ago I explored definitions of prejudice and was struck by how many included the word ‘negative’, as captured more recently by Levy Paluk et al.'s (2021) proposal that "prejudice is animus, or negative bias, toward social groups and their putative members". Other definitions focus on objective measures of fair or just behavior, or might refer to unwarranted generalisations about groups.

To me, these definitions lacked two components that seemed important to capture the phenomenology of prejudice. One was the recognition that bias can sometimes be positive, and the other was that prejudice is necessarily comparative. That is, prejudice involves preferring, implicitly or explicitly, one group over another. This matters because discrimination (unequal treatment) can easily occur through positive preference rather than negativity or derogation.

So by what currency might we define prejudice? I think that the currency is the relative social and psychological value we attach to people. With that in mind, I proposed a definition (Abrams, 2010) that might help us devise strategies to oppose prejudice and prevent discrimination.

Prejudice is ‘bias that devalues people because of their perceived membership of a social group’.

Some people might come up with different or better definitions, but I have found that this one works pretty well and can embrace many different manifestations of prejudice. Based on that definition, our challenge is to work out how to prevent or tackle the devaluing of people because of the way their social group is perceived.

What is to follow? In this series, I will be writing on my own and with other social psychologists about specific areas such as the origins of prejudice in infancy and childhood , political positions and prejudice, the role of intergroup contact and communication, collective action, tolerance of evil, intolerance of diversity, modern expressions of sexism, unexpected effects of ageism, implications of self-stereotyping, the role of emotions in prejudice and so on. Some posts might showcase particular interventions, others will focus more on theories or particular types of evidence. We will argue that prejudice is far from inevitable and that it is eminently stoppable.

I hope you will find the series interesting and challenging, and most importantly I hope it will stimulate your thinking about practical steps that you and others can take to oppose prejudice.

Abrams, D. (2010, p 8). Processes of prejudice: Theory, evidence and intervention. Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research report 56. https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report…

Amodio, D.M., & Cikara, M. (2021). The social neuroscience of prejudice. Annual Review of Psychology, 72, 17.1-17,31. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050928

Choi, J. K., & Bowles, S. (2007). The coevolution of parochial altruism and war. Science 318, 636–640. doi: 10.1126/science.1144237

Fiske, S. T. (2017). Prejudices in cultural contexts: shared stereotypes (gender, age) versus variable stereotypes (race, ethnicity, religion). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(5), 791-799.

Stangor, C. (2016). The study of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination within social psychology: A quick history of theory and research. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (p. 3–27). Psychology Press.

Van Vugt, M., & Park, J. H. (2009). The tribal instinct hypothesis: evolution and the social psychology of intergroup relations, In S. Stürmer and M. Snyder (Eds.) The Psychology of Prosocial Behavior: Group Processes, Intergroup Relations and Helping, (pp 11-32). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Yamagishi, T., Jin, N., & Kiyonari, T. (1999). Bounded generalized reciprocity: ingroup boasting and ingroup favoritism. Advances in Group Processes. 16, 161–197.

Dominic Abrams, Ph.D. , is Professor of Social Psychology and Director of the Centre for the Study of Group Processes at the University of Kent.

• Find a Therapist
• Find a Treatment Center
• Find a Psychiatrist
• Find a Support Group
• Find Online Therapy
• United States
• Brooklyn, NY
• Chicago, IL
• Houston, TX
• Los Angeles, CA
• New York, NY
• Portland, OR
• San Diego, CA
• San Francisco, CA
• Seattle, WA
• Washington, DC
• Asperger's
• Bipolar Disorder
• Chronic Pain
• Eating Disorders
• Passive Aggression
• Personality
• Goal Setting
• Positive Psychology
• Stopping Smoking
• Low Sexual Desire
• Relationships
• Child Development
• Self Tests NEW
• Therapy Center
• Diagnosis Dictionary
• Types of Therapy

Sticking up for yourself is no easy task. But there are concrete skills you can use to hone your assertiveness and advocate for yourself.

• Emotional Intelligence
• Gaslighting
• Affective Forecasting
• Neuroscience

Identifying and Remediating Personal Prejudice: What Does the Evidence Say?

• First Online: 12 May 2020

Cite this chapter

• William Somerville 5 ,
• Sophia Williams Kapten 6 ,
• Iris Yi Miao 6 ,
• Jordan J. Dunn 6 &
• Doris F. Chang 7  

2722 Accesses

1 Citations

In behavioral health settings, prejudice is a serious problem with significant implications for service delivery. Despite genuine efforts to help, clinicians behave in prejudiced ways toward clients and patients, often leading to problems in treatment or to the abandonment of treatment altogether. In this chapter, we outline the history of prejudice research, discuss definitions of prejudice, and review the empirical research on prejudice reduction interventions. We then critique prejudice reduction research from the perspective that collective action may more effectively produce social change. Finally, we return to the necessity of prejudice reduction in behavioral health care, offering practical suggestions from the literature and from our own experience as clinicians, researchers, and educators.

William Somerville, Sophia Williams Kapten, Iris Yi Miao, Jordan J. Dunn, and Doris F. Chang, Department of Clinical Psychology, The New School for Social Research. William Somerville is now at Alliance Psychological Services of New York. Doris F. Chang is now at New York University, Silver School of Social Work. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to William Somerville, Alliance Psychological Services of New York, 1639 Centre St #141, Ridgewood NY 11385 (email: [email protected]).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save.

• Get 10 units per month
• Download Article/Chapter or eBook
• 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
• Cancel anytime
• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

What matters for the scalability of prejudice reduction programs and interventions? A Delphi study

The Prejudice towards People with Mental Illness (PPMI) scale: structure and validity

How Women of Color Detect and Respond to Multiple Forms of Prejudice

Aboud, F. E., Tredoux, C., Tropp, L. R., Brown, C. S., Niens, U., & Noor, N. M. (2012). Interventions to reduce prejudice and enhance inclusion and respect for ethnic differences in early childhood: A systematic review. Developmental Review, 32 (4), 307–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2012.05.001

Article   Google Scholar  

Abramovitz, M., & Blitz, L. (2015). Moving toward racial equity: The Undoing Racism Workshop and organizational change. Race and Social Problems, 7 (2), 97–110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12552-015-9147-4

Alda Díez, M., García Campayo, J., & Sobradiel, N. (2010). Differences in the diagnosis and treatment of immigrant and local psychiatric inpatients admitted to a general hospital in Spain: A controlled study. Actas Espanolas De Psiquiatria, 38 (5), 262–269.

PubMed   Google Scholar  

Ali, A., Caplan, P. J., & Fagnant, R. (2010). Gender stereotypes in diagnostic criteria. In J. C. Chrisler & D. R. McCreary (Eds.), Handbook of gender research in psychology (pp. 91–109). New York, NY: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1467-5

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice . Oxford, UK: Addison-Wesley.

Google Scholar  

Bartoş, S. E., Berger, I., & Hegarty, P. (2014). Interventions to reduce sexual prejudice: A study-space analysis and meta-analytic review. The Journal of Sex Research, 51 (4), 363–382. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2013.871625

Article   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Berdahl, J. L., & Min, J. (2012). Prescriptive stereotypes and workplace consequences for East Asians in North America. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 18 (2), 141–152. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027692

Bezrukova, K., Spell, C. S., Perry, J. L., & Jehn, K. A. (2016). A meta-analytical integration of over 40 years of research on diversity training evaluation. Psychological Bulletin, 142 (11), 1227–1274. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000067

Block, C. J. (2016). The impact of color-blind racial ideology on maintaining racial disparities in organizations. In H. A. Neville, M. E. Gallardo, & D. W. Sue (Eds.), The myth of racial color blindness: Manifestations, dynamics, and impact (pp. 243–259). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/14754-015

Burgess, D. J., Beach, M. C., & Saha, S. (2017). Mindfulness practice: A promising approach to reducing the effects of clinician implicit bias on patients. Patient Education and Counseling, 100 (2), 372–376. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2016.09.005

Burgess, D. J., Nelson, D. B., Gravely, A. A., Bair, M. J., Kerns, R. D., Higgins, D. M., … Partin, M. R. (2014). Racial differences in prescription of opioid analgesics for chronic noncancer pain in a national sample of veterans. Journal of Pain, 15 (4), 447–455. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2013.12.010

Burke, S. E., Dovidio, J. F., Perry, S. P., Burgess, D. J., Hardeman, R. R., Phelan, S. M., … van Ryn, M. (2017). Informal training experiences and explicit bias against African Americans among medical students. Social Psychology Quarterly, 80 (1), 65–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272516668166

Article   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Calabrese, S. K., Earnshaw, V. A., Underhill, K., Hansen, N. B., & Dovidio, J. F. (2014). The impact of patient race on clinical decisions related to prescribing HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP): Assumptions about sexual risk compensation and implications for access. AIDS and Behavior; New York, 18 (2), 226–240. http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.newschool.edu/10.1007/s10461-013-0675-x

Carnes, M., Devine, P. G., Manwell, L. B., Byars-Winston, A., Fine, E., Ford, C. E., … Kaatz, A. (2015). Effect of an intervention to break the gender bias habit for faculty at one institution: A cluster randomized, controlled trial. Academic Medicine, 90 (2), 221–230. https://doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0000000000000552

Cheng, A. W., Iwamoto, D. K., & McMullen, D. (2016). Model minority stereotype and the diagnosis of alcohol use disorders: Implications for practitioners working with Asian Americans. Journal of Ethnicity in Substance Abuse, 17 (3), 255–272. https://doi.org/10.1080/15332640.2016.1175990

Chin, J. L. (2013). Diversity leadership: Influence of ethnicity, gender, and minority status. Open Journal of Leadership, 2 (1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojl.2013.21001

Colbert, J. D., Martin, B. J., Haykowsky, M. J., Hauer, T. L., Austford, L. D., Arena, R. A., … Stone, J. A. (2015). Cardiac rehabilitation referral, attendance and mortality in women. European Journal of Preventive Cardiology, 22 (8), 979–986. https://doi.org/10.1177/2047487314545279

Devine, P. G. (2016). Outline of new intervention . Retrieved from https://osf.io/gkjxs/

Devine, P. G., Forscher, P. S., Austin, A. J., & Cox, W. T. L. (2012). Long-term reduction in implicit race bias: A prejudice habit-breaking intervention. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48 (6), 1267–1278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.06.003

Devine, P. G., Forscher, P. S., Cox, W. T. L., Kaatz, A., Sheridan, J., & Carnes, M. (2017). A gender bias habit-breaking intervention led to increased hiring of female faculty in STEMM departments . Retrieved from https://psyarxiv.com/tdvy7/

Dixon, J., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2005). Beyond the optimal contact strategy: A reality check for the contact hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60 (7), 697–711. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.7.697

Dixon, J., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2007). Intergroup contact and attitudes toward the principle and practice of racial equality. Psychological Science, 18 (10), 867–872.

Dixon, J., & Levine, M. (2012). Beyond prejudice: Extending the social psychology of conflict, inequality and social change . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306114522415i

Book   Google Scholar  

Dixon, J., Levine, M., Reicher, S., & Durrheim, K. (2012). Beyond prejudice: Are negative evaluations the problem and is getting us to like one another more the solution? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35 (6), 411–425. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11002214

Dixon, J., Tropp, L. R., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2010). “Let them eat harmony”: Prejudice-reduction strategies and attitudes of historically disadvantaged groups. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19 (2), 76–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721410363366

Dobkin, P. L., Bernardi, N. F., & Bagnis, C. I. (2016). Enhancing clinicians’ well-being and patient-centered care through mindfulness. Journal of Continuing Education in the Health Professions, 36 (1), 11–16. https://doi.org/10.1097/CEH.0000000000000021

Dovidio, J. F. (2001). On the nature of contemporary prejudice: The third wave. Journal of Social Issues, 57 (4), 829–849. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00244

Dovidio, J. F., & Fiske, S. T. (2012). Under the radar: How unexamined biases in decision-making processes in clinical interactions can contribute to health care disparities. American Journal of Public Health, 102 (5), 945–952. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2011.300601

Dovidio, J. F., Hewstone, M., Glick, P., & Esses, V. M. (2010). Prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination: Theoretical and empirical overview. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination (pp. 3–28). London, UK: Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446200919

Duckitt, J. H. (1992). Psychology and prejudice: A historical analysis and integrative framework. American Psychologist, 47 (10), 1182–1193. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.10.1182

Emlet, C. A. (2006). “You’re awfully old to have this disease”: Experiences of stigma and ageism in adults 50 years and older living with HIV/AIDS. The Gerontologist, 46 (6), 781–790. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17169933

Fairchild, H. H. (1991). Scientific racism: The cloak of objectivity. Journal of Social Issues, 47 (3), 101–115. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1991.tb01825.x

Ferguson, S. H. (1996). Christian violence and the slave narrative. American Literature, 68 (2), 297–320. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2928299

Fitzgerald, C., & Hurst, S. (2017). Implicit bias in healthcare professionals: A systematic review. BMC Medical Ethics, 18 (1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-017-0179-8

Forscher, P. S., & Devine, P. G. (2014). Breaking the prejudice habit: Automaticity and control in the context of a long-term goal. In J. W. Sherman, B. Gawronski, & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories of the social mind (pp. 468–482). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Forscher, P. S., Lai, C. K., Axt, J. R., Ebersole, C. R., Herman, M., Devine, P. G., & Nosek, B.A. (2019). A meta-analysis of procedures to change implicit measures. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 117, 522–559. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000160

Forscher, P. S., Mitamura, C., Dix, E. L., Cox, W. T. L., & Devine, P. G. (2017). Breaking the prejudice habit: Mechanisms, timecourse, and longevity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 72 , 133–146.

Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed . New York, NY: Bloomsbury.

Garb, H. N. (1997). Race bias, social class bias, and gender bias in clinical judgment. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 4 (2), 99–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2850.1997.tb00104.x

Garb, H. N. (1998). Clinical judgment. In Studying the clinician: Judgment research and psychological assessment (pp. 173–206). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1097/NND.0000000000000054

Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as complementary justifications for gender inequality. American Psychologist, 56 (2), 109–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.2.109

Gordon, K. H., Brattole, M. M., Wingate, L. R. R., & Joiner, T. E. (2006). The impact of client race on clinician detection of eating disorders. Behavior Therapy, 37 (4), 319–325. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2005.12.002

Green, K. M. (2015). Bound to respect: Antebellum narratives of black imprisonment, servitude, and bondage, 1816–1861 . Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74 (6), 1464–1480. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9654756

Gross, A. L. (2015). Being and becoming an ally: The lived experience of social justice action from privileged spaces (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Massachusetts Boston.

Hayes, J. A., & Erkis, A. J. (2000). Therapist homophobia, client sexual orientation, and source of client HIV infection as predictors of therapist reactions to clients with HIV. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 47 (1), 71–78. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-0167.47.1.71

Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and the third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies. Behavior Therapy, 35 , 639–665. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80013-3

Hayes, S. C., Bissett, R., Roget, N., Padilla, M., Kohlenberg, B. S., Fisher, G., … Niccolls, R. (2004). The impact of acceptance and commitment training and multicultural training on the stigmatizing attitudes and professional burnout of substance abuse counselors. Behavior Therapy, 35 (4), 821–835. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(04)80022-4

Helms, J. E. (2017). The challenge of making whiteness visible: Reactions to four whiteness articles. The Counseling Psychologist, 45 (5), 717–726. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000017718943

Herek, G. M., & Garnets, L. D. (2007). Sexual orientation and mental health. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 3 (1), 353–375. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.3.022806.091510

Hofmann, W., De Houwer, J., Perugini, M., Baeyens, F., & Crombez, G. (2010). Evaluative conditioning in humans: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136 (3), 390–421. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018916

Holoien, D. S., & Shelton, J. N. (2012). You deplete me: The cognitive costs of colorblindness on ethnic minorities. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48 (2), 562–565. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.09.010

Hunsinger, M., Livingston, R., & Isbell, L. (2014). Spirituality and intergroup harmony: Meditation and racial prejudice. Mindfulness, 5 (2), 139–144. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-012-0159-5

Institute of Medicine. (2003). Assessing potential sources of racial and ethnic disparities in care: The clinical encounter. In Unequal treatment: Confronting racial and ethnic disparities in healthcare (pp. 160–179). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Irving, J. A., Park-Saltzman, J., Fitzpatrick, M., Dobkin, P. L., Chen, A., & Hutchinson, T. (2014). Experiences of health care professionals enrolled in mindfulness-based medical practice: A grounded theory model. Mindfulness, 5 (1), 60–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-012-0147-9

Johnson, S., & Orrell, M. (1996). Insight, psychosis and ethnicity: A case-note study. Psychological Medicine, 26 , 1081–1084.

Kang, Y., Gray, J. R., & Dovidio, J. F. (2014). The nondiscriminating heart: Lovingkindness meditation training decreases implicit intergroup bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143 (3), 1306–1313. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034150

Kirmayer, L., Groleaud, D., Guzder, J., Blake, C., & Jarvis, E. (2003). Cultural consultation: A model of mental health services for multicultural societies. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 48 (3), 145–153. https://doi.org/10.1176/foc.4.1.125

Krasner, M. S., Epstein, R. M., Beckman, H., Suchman, A. L., Chapman, B., Mooney, C. J., & Quill, T. E. (2009). Association of an educational program in mindful communication with burnout, empathy and attitudes among primary care physicians. JAMA, 302 (12), 1284–1293.

Lai, C. K., Marini, M., Lehr, S. A., Cerruti, C., Shin, J.-E. L., Joy-Gaba, J. A., … Nosek, B. A. (2014). Reducing implicit racial preferences: I. A comparative investigation of 17 interventions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143 (4), 1765–1785. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036260

Lai, C. K., Skinner, A. L., Cooley, E., Murrar, S., Brauer, M., Devos, T., … Nosek, B. A. (2016). Reducing implicit racial preferences: II. Intervention effectiveness across time. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145 (8), 1001–1016. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000179

Lamothe, M., Rondeau, É., Malboeuf-Hurtubise, C., Duval, M., & Sultan, S. (2016). Outcomes of MBSR or MBSR-based interventions in health care providers: A systematic review with a focus on empathy and emotional competencies. Complementary Therapies in Medicine, 24 , 19–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ctim.2015.11.001

Lewis-Fernández, R., Aggarwal, N. K., Hinton, L., Hinton, D. E., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2016). DSM-5 handbook on the cultural formulation interview . Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association Publishing.

Lillis, J., & Hayes, S. C. (2007). Applying acceptance, mindfulness, and values to the reduction of prejudice: A pilot study. Behavior Modification, 31 (4), 389–411. https://doi.org/10.1177/0145445506298413

Lueke, A., & Gibson, B. (2015). Mindfulness meditation reduces implicit age and race bias: The role of reduced automaticity of responding. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6 (3), 284–291. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550614559651

MacLean, K. A., Ferrer, E., Aichele, S. R., Bridwell, D. A., Zanesco, A. P., Jacobs, T. L., … Saron, C. D. (2010). Intensive meditation training improves perceptual discrimination and sustained attention. Psychological Science, 21 (6), 829–839. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610371339

Masuda, A., Hayes, S. C., Fletcher, L. B., Seignourel, P. J., Bunting, K., Herbst, S. A., … Lillis, J. (2007). Impact of acceptance and commitment therapy versus education on stigma toward people with psychological disorders. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45 (11), 2764–2772. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2007.05.008

Masuda, A., Hill, M. L., Morgan, J., & Cohen, L. L. (2012). A psychological flexibility-based intervention for modulating the impact of stigma and prejudice: A descriptive review of empirical evidence. Psychology, Society, & Education, 4 (2), 211–223. https://doi.org/10.25115/psye.v4i2.492

Mizock, L., & Lundquist, C. (2016). Missteps in psychotherapy with transgender clients: Promoting gender sensitivity in counseling and psychological practice. Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity, 3 (2), 148–155. https://doi.org/10.1037/sgd0000177

Motel, L. (2016). Increasing diversity through goal-setting in corporate social responsibility reporting. Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal, 35 (5/6), 328–349.

Nnawulezi, N., Ryan, A., & O’Connor, R. C. (2016). Reducing prejudice within community-based organizations. Journal of Community Practice, 24 , 182–204. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705422.2016.1157541

Obasogie, O. K., & Newman, Z. (2016). Black lives matter and respectability politics in local news accounts of officer-involved civilian deaths: An early empirical assessment. Wisconsin Law Review, 3 , 541–574.

Paluck, E. L., & Green, D. P. (2009). Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice. Annual Review of Psychology, 60 (1), 339–367. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163607

Pedersen, A., Walker, I., Paradies, Y., & Guerin, B. (2011). How to cook rice: A review of ingredients for teaching anti-prejudice. Australian Psychologist, 46 (1), 55–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-9544.2010.00015.x

Regehr, C., Glancy, D., Pitts, A., & LeBlanc, V. R. (2014). Interventions to reduce the consequences of stress in physicians: A review and meta-analysis. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 202 (5), 353–359. https://doi.org/10.1097/NMD.0000000000000130

Riggs, D. W., & Sion, R. (2017). Gender differences in cisgender psychologists’ and trainees’ attitudes toward transgender people. Psychology of Men and Masculinity, 18 (2), 187–190. https://doi.org/10.1037/men0000047

Rosenberg, E. L., Zanesco, A. P., King, B. G., Jacobs, T. L., MacLean, K. A., Shaver, P. R., … Saron, C. D. (2015). Intensive meditation training influences emotional responses to suffering. Emotion, 15 (6), 775–790. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000080

Samelson, F. (1978). From “race psychology” to “studies in prejudice”: Some observations on the thematic reversal in social psychology. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 14 (3), 265–278. https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6696(197807)14:3<265::AID-JHBS2300140313>3.0.CO;2-P

Shapiro, S. L., Astin, J. A., Bishop, S. R., & Cordova, M. (2005). Mindfulness-based stress reduction for health care professionals: Results from a randomized trial. International Journal of Stress Management, 12 (2), 164–176. https://doi.org/10.1037/1072-5245.12.2.164

Shelton, K., & Delgado-Romero, E. A. (2011). Sexual orientation microaggressions: The experience of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer clients in psychotherapy. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 58 (2), 210–221. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022251

Shemberg, K. M., & Doherty, M. E. (1999). Is diagnostic judgment influenced by a bias to see pathology? Journal of Clinical Psychology, 55 (4), 513–518. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-4679(199904)55:4<513::AID-JCLP13>3.0.CO;2-W

Shin, R. Q., Smith, L. C., Welch, J. C., & Ezeofor, I. (2016). Is Allison more likely than Lakisha to receive a callback from counseling professionals? A racism audit study. The Counseling Psychologist, 44 (8), 1187–1211. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000016668814

Shyman, E. (2016). The reinforcement of ableism: Normality, the medical model of disability, and humanism in applied behavior analysis and ASD. Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 54 (5), 366–376. https://doi.org/10.1352/1934-9556-54.5.366

Smith, L., Foley, P. F., & Chaney, M. P. (2008). Addressing classism, ableism, and heterosexism in counselor education. Journal of Counseling and Development, 86 (3), 303–310. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6678.2008.tb00513.x

Spanierman, L. B., & Smith, L. (2017). Roles and responsibilities of white allies: Implications for research, teaching, and practice. The Counseling Psychologist, 45 (5), 606–617. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000017717712

Stell, A. J., & Farsides, T. (2016). Brief loving-kindness meditation reduces racial bias, mediated by positive other-regarding emotions. Motivation and Emotion, 40 , 140–147. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-015-9514-x

Sue, D. W. (2017). The challenges of becoming a white ally. The Counseling Psychologist, 45 (5), 706–716. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000017719323

Sue, S. (1999). Science, ethnicity, and bias: Where have we gone wrong? American Psychologist, 54 (12), 1070–1077. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.12.1070

Suhr, J. A. (2015). Psychological assessment: A problem-solving approach . New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Thompson, M. N., Cole, O. D., & Nitzarim, R. S. (2012). Recognizing social class in the psychotherapy relationship: A grounded theory exploration of low-income clients. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 59 (2), 208–221. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027534

van den Hurk, P. A. M., Janssen, B. H., Giommi, F., Barendregt, H. P., & Gielen, S. C. (2010). Mindfulness meditation associated with alterations in bottom-up processing: Psychophysiological evidence for reduced reactivity. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 78 (2), 151–157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2010.07.002

van Klei, W. A., Hoff, R. G., Van Aarnhem, E. E. H. L., Simmermacher, R. K. J., Regli, L. P. E., Kappen, T. H., … Peelen, L. M. (2012). Effects of the introduction of the WHO “Surgical Safety Checklist” on in-hospital mortality: A cohort study. Annals of Surgery, 255 (1), 44–49. https://doi.org/10.1097/SLA.0b013e31823779ae

Villalobos, J. (2015). Applying white followership in campus organizing: A leadership tool for Latinx students working for racial justice. In A. Lozano (Ed.), Latina/o college student leadership: Emerging theory, promising practice (pp. 167–184). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Wright, S. C. (2003). Strategic collective action: Social psychology and social change. In R. Brown & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes (pp. 409–430). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd.. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470693421.ch20

Wright, S. C., & Baray, G. (2012). Models of social change in social psychology: Collective action or prejudice reduction? Conflict or harmony? In J. Dixon & M. Levine (Eds.), Beyond prejudice: Extending the social psychology of conflict, inequality, and social change (pp. 225–247). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, S. C., & Lubensky, M. E. (2013). The struggle for social equality: Collective action versus prejudice reduction. In S. Demoulin, J. Leyens, & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), Intergroup misunderstandings: Impact of divergent social realities (pp. 291–310). New York, NY: Psychology Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203848814

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Alliance Psychological Services of New York, Ridgewood, NY, USA

William Somerville

Department of Clinical Psychology, The New School for Social Research, New York, NY, USA

Sophia Williams Kapten, Iris Yi Miao & Jordan J. Dunn

NYU Silver School of Social Work, New York, NY, USA

Doris F. Chang

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Department of Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA

Lorraine T. Benuto

Melanie P. Duckworth

Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI, USA

Akihiko Masuda

William O'Donohue

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Somerville, W., Kapten, S.W., Miao, I.Y., Dunn, J.J., Chang, D.F. (2020). Identifying and Remediating Personal Prejudice: What Does the Evidence Say?. In: Benuto, L., Duckworth, M., Masuda, A., O'Donohue, W. (eds) Prejudice, Stigma, Privilege, and Oppression. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35517-3_11

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35517-3_11

Published : 12 May 2020

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-030-35516-6

Online ISBN : 978-3-030-35517-3

eBook Packages : Behavioral Science and Psychology Behavioral Science and Psychology (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

• Skip to main content
• Accessibility help

Information

We use cookies to collect anonymous data to help us improve your site browsing experience.

Click 'Accept all cookies' to agree to all cookies that collect anonymous data. To only allow the cookies that make the site work, click 'Use essential cookies only.' Visit 'Set cookie preferences' to control specific cookies.

Your cookie preferences have been saved. You can change your cookie settings at any time.

What works to reduce prejudice and discrimination? - A review of the evidence

A review of international evidence on prejudice reduction interventions

Section Three: Theories On Prejudice-Reduction

The previous section provided a brief discussion of what prejudice is and how it functions, included some important caveats, and raised issues around definition and terminology. It is important to explore these concerns when thinking about what interventions might be useful in terms of challenging prejudice more broadly, as well as specifically relating to sectarianism in Scotland. Before going on to examine some of the evaluated prejudice-reduction interventions, and the available evidence of their effectiveness, it is necessary to present some of the key theories behind the literature, which is dominated by psychology studies. This section summarises some of the key theoretical bases for some of the most frequently-used and potentially effective prejudice-reduction interventions. Of course, there are broader debates about whether governments have the right to intervene in such domains (Libertarian vs. 'nanny-state' approaches), however this report presupposes that careful intervention is acceptable - assuming flexibility, transparency, reflection, and a voluntary approach.

There is no standard way of categorising the various types of interventions, but theories of prejudice reduction can be roughly divided into two camps. The first is the theory of intergroup contact whereby association with other groups may reduce negative attitudes and promote inclusivity. The second comprises of theories which focus on exposure to information about other groups, which challenge and alter the way people think about other groups (through education and re-education, or media, for example). These are sometimes known as antibias theories. The latter assumes that contact alone is not sufficient, and that people need to re-educate themselves to move on from old assumptions and to change attitudes. Educational initiatives and media campaigns will have objectives of reducing 'threat' through increased knowledge and learning, for example. These two broad approaches are not always separate; indeed the majority of interventions will overlap to some extent.

Intergroup contact theories

Allport (1954) developed the original 'contact hypothesis', proposing that interaction between members of different groups would help to facilitate prejudice reduction, particularly if the interrelated conditions of intergroup contact - equal status (and power); interdependence (common goals); and authority sanction (support from relevant authorities) - were met. The notion that positive experiences with members of a perceived 'out-group' might help to counter negative perceptions or stereotypes associated with this group may seem basic, almost a common-sense approach, however the contact hypothesis is the root of most prejudice-reduction theory. Cross-group friendships have been shown to reduce intergroup anxiety and promote empathy, and studies have found that contact is particularly effective at helping to reduce prejudice amongst children. Abrams (2010: 69) notes that:

"Intergroup contact and school diversity tend to be associated with improved intergroup understanding and positive attitudes"

Prejudice is often a result of false beliefs, misconceptions and stereotypes, so common sense would suggest that discovering that these are incorrect through contact with other groups will result in improved attitudes. Lab-based and field studies have continually confirmed the effectiveness of contact, highlighting its ability to challenge prejudice by reducing intergroup anxiety and increasing empathy for other groups (the two underlying mechanisms). In a meta-analytic test of 'Intergroup Contact Theory', based on 713 independent samples from 515 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006: 922) found that:

"Greater intergroup contact typically corresponds with lower levels of intergroup prejudice, and 94% of the studies reveal an inverse relationship between contact and prejudices of many types".

Central to the contact theory is the notion that developing more positive than negative ideas about an out-group will extend beyond the immediate contact so that reductions in prejudice are not confined to individuals in contact, and instead impact on attitudes towards entire groups. However, according to Brown (1995) and Brown et al (1999), this depends on maintaining the salience of group differences. It is argued that boundaries should be maintained in order to increase the chance of generalisation of positive attitudes towards the group as a whole. Brown suggests that if contact takes place in a context where group difference is played down - for example, through emphasising shared identity, sameness - then members of the 'out-group' are less likely to be seen as 'representative' of the wider group, and positive attitudes may only be directed at individual level. Such debates highlight the complex balance between trying to maintain distinction in a positive sense while attempting to remove the more negative associations of stereotyping.

Direct contact is not always necessary: the 'extended contact' hypothesis posits that even knowledge that a member of the in-group has positive relationships with out-group members can also reduce prejudice (for example, 'friends of friends'). The following section will also touch on vicarious contact through media etc. when actual contact between groups is rare. Intergroup contact theory traditionally focused on 'racial' or other ethnic groups, as it was a key area of interest for psychologists and other scholars interested in prejudice in the context of growing civil rights movement in the mid-20th century. However, evidence supports extending this to other intergroup contexts (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006: 766), and more recently increased attention has been given to other forms of prejudice such as towards LGBT groups or disabled people.

Significantly, research by Hodson (2011) concluded that individuals holding high levels of prejudice actually benefited more from intergroup contact than relatively tolerant people did, highlighting the potential value of contact. The reasons for this are not fully explained. The 'ceiling effect', in the sense that people with already favourable attitudes towards other groups have less 'room for improvement', only partly explains this. Hodson suggests that significantly reducing threat and anxiety through contact is particularly effective for people with higher levels of prejudice, and encourages further research to explore this further. This also emphasises the need to consider who is most in need of intervention, and to bear this in mind when designing, implementing, and evaluating interventions. As Hodson notes, highly prejudiced people are more likely to deliberately avoid intergroup contact, so thinking about how to promote opportunities for contact and remove barriers for those less likely to seek it is vital. Are the prejudice-reduction interventions that exist reaching the people that will benefit most? If not, how can we work towards this?

However, there are limitations, and we should think critically about the value of contact. Although contact is positive in general, it needs to be sensitively managed and designed or it can be counter-productive. People have to see improved attitudes or relations as a desired objective. Temporary contact, which may often be superficial (for example, attendance at a half-day 'diversity workshop' in the workplace), will not be as effective at changing attitudes compared to long-term contact with the potential for cross-group friendships. In this vein, Pettigrew (1998) calls for an additional criteria to Allport's 'contact conditions' - length of contact which would allow for the development of possible friendships between members of different groups.

Yet even long-term proximity will not always naturally encourage positive relations and/or a reduction in prejudiced attitudes. According to Abrams (2010: 81), studies show even when schools are 'mixed', children tend to favour same-race rather than cross-race friendship. A study conducted for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 2005 also found that pupils attending schools in multi-cultural areas displayed less, not more, tolerance to pupils from different ethnic backgrounds (17). Moreover, returning again to the point about relations between men and women, it is clear that high levels of contact (and the fact that men generally have positive views about women) does not remove the existence of gender stereotyping or sexual discrimination. Pettigrew (2008) notes that the prejudiced views about women that some men hold occur when women "step out of the roles society has prescribed for them" (115). Exposure itself, even if long-term, is insufficient, because most contact situations do not meet Allport's 'conditions' ( e.g. 'equal power and status). It is crucial to consider the context and quality of contact, as well as issues of (historic and contemporary) power relations: a crucial caveat for contact theories. Devine (1989) suggests that a significant amount of effort is required on the part of individuals if their prejudices are to be overcome. The recognition of one's own bias, and the desire to overcome prejudice, must exist.

Going beyond contact: actively challenging bias

Given the limitations of contact theory, in some cases it may be necessary to purposely challenge prejudices, though this should be done carefully and not necessarily in a 'direct' manner. As emphasised earlier, prejudice may be held and acted upon by individuals, however it is a social problem, and as such requires us to consider how social change materialises. As an example we might consider how racism (at least in its crude, biological guise) became less socially acceptable in the latter decades of the 20th century. Lewin (1947/1951), one of the founders of social psychology and among the first to examine group dynamics and tensions, theorised that change in individuals is most successfully achieved through group encounters. Lewin's work preceded the development of Allport's contact hypothesis, but arguably helps to address some of its limitations. For Lewin, a process of 'reeducation' can challenge entrenched perceptions, stereotypes, and values. His theory is summarised by Bargal (2008):

"Lewin (1945/1948) likened false stereotypes and prejudices to erroneous concepts and theories. In his view, the first step to changing those concepts and theories is to re-examine them. Re-examination should be carried out through an alternative perception of the self and one's social relations. It cannot be left to accident, and group experiences should be planned as a forum for such re-examination. Lewin suggested that through the group one can acquire norms and means to learn new perceptions and behaviours, marked by a commitment to self-examination, active confrontation with one's own perceptions and perceptions held by the other group members, active involvement in problem solving, and a willingness to expose oneself to empirical examination of ideas and conceptions"

Lewin highlights some of the key conditions in which re-education in a group setting might bring about positive change in prejudiced attitudes. Ideally, the interaction should take place in an informal setting. Participation should be voluntary and, importantly, people should be free to express their often conflicting viewpoints in a safe environment. These conditions may help alleviate some of the unintended effects that contact can cause - such as the increased levels of prejudice towards other ethnic groups in schools with higher levels of diversity noted in the aforementioned Joseph Rowntree Foundation report. Contact within schools is of course not voluntary or informal, and pupils are subject to rules and regulations about what they can and cannot say or do. 'Mixing' groups in more informal settings, for example recreational activities, may result in increased positive interactions - essentially more meaningful contact. As will be discussed throughout this report, studies seem to support these points in terms of what interventions are most effective.

Various educational strategies can be employed in this sense, to seemingly positive effect. Cooperative learning programmes are arguably the most widespread interventions in schools. Paluck and Green (2009) argue that meta-analyses of studies based on the idea of cooperative learning "consistently confirmed a positive impact of cooperation on outcomes such as positive peer relationships and helpfulness" (355), though long-term effects are obviously harder to track. Educational efforts to reduce implicit bias include encouraging empathy, perspective taking, and 'imagining counter-stereotypic examples'. Like other prejudice-reduction initiatives, empathy-inducing interventions have most potential to be successful with young children (Abrams 2010) but this does not preclude these being used in adolescent or adult education settings.

Walsh (1988) suggests that prejudice could be challenged by teaching people to question their assumptions about the world around them, stating that "thinking critically is the antithesis of prejudicial thinking." Thinking critically, learning about history, discussion of sensitive topics, and shared learning / shared curriculums are some of the key themes that emerge from the literature on tackling prejudice through education. Walsh highlights the challenges of articulating a positive, anti-prejudice message:

"Research suggests that direct teaching of prejudice-reduction techniques may be ineffective, whereas indirect teaching of the skills and dispositions needed to combat prejudice is effective. This simply means that merely telling students they should not be prejudiced is ineffectual" (1988).

Rather than 'instructing' what types of behaviours, language, or attitudes, for example, are 'wrong' - something that, as noted earlier, is often subjective and contested - teaching skills and disposition, such as critical thinking and empathy, could be more effective.

Email: Ben Cavanagh

There is a problem

Thanks for your feedback

Your feedback helps us to improve this website. Do not give any personal information because we cannot reply to you directly.